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This paper studies how changes in oil supply expectations affect the oil price
and the macroeconomy. Using a novel identification design, exploiting insti-
tutional features of OPEC and high-frequency data, I identify an oil supply
news shock. These shocks have statistically and economically significant ef-
fects. Negative news leads to an immediate increase in oil prices, a gradual
fall in oil production and an increase in inventories. This has consequences
for the U.S. economy: activity falls, prices and inflation expectations rise,
and the dollar depreciates—providing evidence for a strong channel operating
through supply expectations.
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1. Introduction
Recent turbulences in the oil market have sparked renewed interest in the long-
standing question of how oil prices affect the macroeconomy. This question is chal-
lenging because oil prices are endogenous and respond to global economic develop-
ments. To provide an answer, one has to account for the underlying drivers of the oil
price. From a policy perspective, oil supply shocks are of particular interest because
of their stagflationary effects. However, as oil prices are inherently forward-looking,
not only current supply matters but also expectations about the future.
In this paper, I propose a novel approach to identify a shock to oil supply expec-
tations, exploiting institutional features of the Organization of the Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC) and information contained in high-frequency data. The
idea is to use variation in oil futures prices around OPEC production announce-
ments. OPEC accounts for about 44 percent of world oil production and thus, its
announcements can have a significant impact on oil prices (Lin and Tamvakis, 2010;
Loutia, Mellios, and Andriosopoulos, 2016). While OPEC is known to be heavily
driven by political considerations, its decisions are likely not exogenous but also
depend on the state of the global economy (Barsky and Kilian, 2004). However,
by measuring the changes in oil futures prices in a tight window around the an-
nouncements, we can isolate the impact of news about future oil supply. Reverse
causality of the global economic outlook can be plausibly ruled out because it is
already priced in at the time of the announcement and is unlikely to change within
the tight window. Using the resulting series as an external instrument in an oil
market VAR model, I am able to identify a structural oil supply news shock.
Preview of results. Oil supply news shocks have statistically and economically
significant effects. Negative news about future oil supply leads to a large, immediate
increase in oil prices, a gradual but significant fall in world oil production and a
significant increase in world oil inventories. Global economic activity does not change
significantly on impact but then starts to fall persistently. This has consequences for
the U.S. economy: industrial production falls and consumer prices rise significantly.
This evidence supports the notion that changes in expectations about future supply
can have powerful effects even if current oil production does not move.
I also show that oil supply news contribute meaningfully to historical variations
in the oil price. This finding illustrates that major episodes in oil markets, such as
political events in the Middle East, impact the oil price not only through their effect
on current supply but, crucially, also through changes in supply expectations.
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Studying various propagation channels of oil supply news, I find that oil price
and inflation expectations rise significantly while uncertainty indicators are hardly
affected—consistent with the interpretation of a news shock. Interestingly, the rise
in inflation expectations is stronger for households, in line with recent evidence by
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015). Oil supply news also lead to a significant in-
crease in consumer prices even after excluding energy prices, a persistent fall in
consumption and investment expenditures, rising unemployment, and falling stock
market indices. The U.S. dollar depreciates significantly, especially against the cur-
rencies of net oil exporting countries. Consistent with the exchange rate response,
the terms of trade deteriorates substantially and the trade balance falls into deficit.
Oil supply news shocks also turn out to be an important driver of the economy as
they explain a significant share of the variations in economic activity and prices.
A comprehensive series of sensitivity checks indicate that the results are robust
along a number of dimensions including the identification design, the estimation
approach, as well as the model specification and sample period. In particular, the
results are robust to accounting for background noise over the event window. An
heteroskedasticity-based estimator produces consistent results, even though the re-
sponses are less precisely estimated. I also show that the results are robust to esti-
mating the responses to the identified shock using local projections and controlling
for OPEC’s global demand forecasts in the construction of the instrument.
Related literature and contribution. This paper is related to a long litera-
ture studying the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks. A key insight in this
literature is that oil price shocks do not occur ceteris paribus. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to account for the fundamental drivers of oil price fluctuations (Kilian, 2009).
These include oil supply, global demand and expectations about future oil market
conditions. In the last years, the literature has made substantial progress in dis-
entangling these drivers using SVAR models of the oil market, identified with the
help of zero restrictions (Kilian, 2009), sign restrictions (Kilian and Murphy, 2012;
Lippi and Nobili, 2012; Baumeister and Peersman, 2013; Baumeister and Hamilton,
2019), and narrative information (Antolín-Díaz and Rubio-Ramírez, 2018; Caldara,
Cavallo, and Iacoviello, 2019; Zhou, 2020).
A difficult problem in this context is the identification of the expectations-driven
component. A number of studies have addressed this problem by augmenting the
standard oil market model by global oil inventory data (Kilian and Murphy, 2014;
Juvenal and Petrella, 2015). The idea is that expectational shifts in the oil market
should be reflected in the demand for oil inventories (see also Hamilton, 2009; Alquist
and Kilian, 2010). An important challenge is that these shifts in inventory demand
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capture many different things, including news about future demand and supply or
higher uncertainty, that existing identification strategies cannot disentangle.
This paper contributes to this literature by proposing a new source of informa-
tion and a novel identification strategy that can shed light on the role of oil supply
expectations. Using high-frequency variation in oil prices around OPEC announce-
ments, I identify a news shock about future oil supply. While I do not model the oil
futures market explicitly, I show that oil futures prices contain valuable information
for identification. High-frequency oil supply surprises turn out to be strong instru-
ments for the price of oil. This is relevant as other proxies for oil shocks, including
Hamilton’s (2003) quantitative dummies or Kilian’s (2008) production shortfall se-
ries, have been found to be weak instruments (Stock and Watson, 2012).
From a methodological viewpoint, my approach is closely related to the high-
frequency identification of monetary policy shocks. In this literature, monetary
policy surprises are identified using high-frequency asset price movements around
monetary policy events, such as FOMC announcements (Kuttner, 2001; Gürkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson, 2005; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018a, among others). The
idea is to isolate the impact of monetary policy news by measuring the change
in asset prices in a tight window around policy announcements. To account for
confounding news over the event window, Rigobon and Sack (2004) propose to
exploit the heteroskedasticity in the data. Gertler and Karadi (2015) use these
high-frequency surprises as an external instrument in a monetary SVAR to estimate
the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy shocks. The key idea of this paper is
to apply this approach to the oil market, exploiting institutional features of OPEC.
This paper is not the first to look at OPEC announcements. In fact, there is
a large literature analyzing the effects of OPEC announcements on oil prices using
event study techniques (Draper, 1984; Loderer, 1985; Demirer and Kutan, 2010,
among others). To the best of my knowledge, however, this paper is the first to look
at the macroeconomic effects of these announcements—combining the event study
literature on OPEC meetings with the traditional oil market VAR analysis.1
My results indicate that news about future oil supply can have a meaningful
impact on the oil price and macroeconomic aggregates even if current production
does not move. In this sense, I also contribute to the literature on the role of news
in the business cycle by providing evidence for a strong expectational channel in the
oil market. Traditionally, this literature focuses on anticipated technology (Beaudry
and Portier, 2006; Barsky and Sims, 2011) and fiscal shocks (Ramey, 2011; Leeper,
1There are a few papers that also exploited the financial market reaction to oil events for
identification but in somewhat different contexts (Cavallo and Wu, 2012; Anzuini, Pagano, and
Pisani, 2015; Branger, Flacke, and Gräber, 2020).
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Walker, and Yang, 2013). Only recently, there has been a growing interest in other
kinds of news, such as news about future monetary policy or production possibilities
(Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018a; Arezki, Ramey, and Sheng, 2017). Gambetti and
Moretti (2017) also identify a news shock in the oil market but focus on the role of
news versus noise shocks.
Outline. The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the iden-
tification design, providing background information on OPEC, details on the con-
struction of the instrument and some diagnostic tests. In Section 3, I cover the
econometric approach. Section 4 presents the results. I start by analyzing the in-
strument strength before discussing the effects of oil supply news on the oil market
and the macroeconomy, the contribution to historical episodes in the oil market, the
wider effects and propagation channels as well as the quantitative importance. In
Section 5, I perform a number of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2. Identification
The identification strategy in this paper is motivated by the following observations.
The oil market is dominated by a big player, OPEC, that makes regular announce-
ments about its production plans. OPEC is closely watched by markets and its
announcements can lead to significant market reactions. This motivates the use of
high-frequency identification techniques. The idea is to construct a series of high-
frequency surprises around OPEC announcements that can be used to identify a
structural oil supply news shock. Before discussing the construction of the surprise
series, I provide some background information on OPEC and the global oil and oil
futures markets.
2.1. Institutional background
The oil market and OPEC. The global oil market has a peculiar structure in
that it is dominated by a few big players. The biggest and most important player
is OPEC. OPEC is an intergovernmental organization of oil producing nations and
accounts for around 44 percent of the world’s crude oil production (based on data
from the US Energy Information Administration EIA for 2016). It was founded in
1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Since then, other countries
joined the organization and currently, OPEC has a total of 13 member countries.2
2The current member countries are Algeria, Angola, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran,
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Venezuela. For more information on the
history of OPEC, see Yergin (2011).
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According to the statutes, OPEC’s mission is to stabilize global oil markets to
secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady
income to producers and a fair return on capital for those investing in the petroleum
industry. Economists, however, often think of OPEC as a cartel that cooperates to
reduce market competition.
The supreme authority of the organization is the OPEC conference, which con-
sists of delegations headed by the oil ministers of the member countries. Several
times a year, the conference meets in order to agree on oil production policies. Since
1982, this includes setting an overall oil production ceiling for the organization and
individual quotas for its members.3 The conference ordinarily meets twice a year on
pre-scheduled dates at its headquarters in Vienna but if necessary it can call for ex-
traordinary meetings on short notice. In making decisions, the conference generally
operates on the principles of unanimity and ‘one member, one vote’. However, since
Saudi Arabia is by far the largest oil producer in OPEC, with enough capacity to
function as a swing producer to balance the global market, it is often thought to be
‘OPEC’s de facto leader’.4
The decisions of the conference are usually announced in a press communiqué
shortly after the meeting concludes, followed by a press conference where members
of the press and analysts can ask questions. A typical announcement starts with a
review of the oil market outlook before communicating the decisions on production
quotas, which normally become effective 30 days later. As an example, I include
below an excerpt of an announcement made on December 14, 2006 after the 143rd
meeting of the OPEC conference:
“Having reviewed the oil market outlook, including the overall demand/
supply expectations for the year 2007, in particular the first and second
quarters, as well as the outlook for the oil market in the medium term,
the Conference observed that market fundamentals clearly indicate that
there is more than ample crude supply, high stock levels and increasing
spare capacity. [. . .]
In view of the above, the Conference decided to reduce OPEC production
by a further 500,000 b/d, with effect from 1 February 2007, in order to
balance supply and demand.”
Despite the fact that OPEC sometimes has trouble agreeing and enforcing its
3The OPEC production quota system was established in 1982. Before, OPEC targeted oil prices
instead of production quantities (OPEC Secretariat, 2003).
4This language is routinely used in the financial press, see e.g. https://www.ft.com/content/
1f84e444-9ceb-11e5-8ce1-f6219b685d74 [Online; accessed 17-Jan-2020].
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production quotas, markets pay close attention to it and its announcements trigger
significant price reactions (see e.g. Lin and Tamvakis, 2010; Loutia, Mellios, and
Andriosopoulos, 2016). In the above example, the announcement led to an oil price
increase of about 2 percent.
Oil futures markets. Crude oil is an internationally traded commodity and there
exist liquid futures markets. The most widely traded contracts are the West Texas
Intermediate (WTI) crude and Brent crude futures. WTI and Brent are grades of
crude oil that are used as benchmarks in pricing oil internationally. I focus on WTI
for the following reasons. First, it is the relevant benchmark for pricing oil in the
U.S., the country of primary interest in this paper. Second, the WTI crude futures
have the longest available history as they were the first traded contracts on crude oil.
They trade at the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and were introduced
in 1983. Finally, it is the most liquid and largest market for crude oil, currently
trading nearly 1.2 million contracts a day (CME Group, 2018).
2.2. Construction of oil supply surprises
To construct a time series of oil supply surprises, I look at how oil futures prices
change around OPEC announcements. Oil futures prices are a natural, market-
based proxy for oil price expectations and thus well suited to measure the impact
of OPEC announcements. However, in principle, we could use any asset price that
is sufficiently responsive.
While OPEC is known to be driven a lot by political considerations, it also
takes global economic conditions into account, as could be seen from the example
announcement above. Thus, its decisions might be subject to endogeneity concerns.
However, by measuring the price changes within a sufficiently tight window around
the announcement, it is possible to isolate the impact of OPEC’s decisions. Reverse
causality of global economic conditions can be plausibly ruled out because they are
known and already priced by the market prior to the announcement and are unlikely
to change within the tight window. Assuming that risk premia are constant over the
window, the resulting series will capture changes in oil price expectations caused by
OPEC announcements.
To be able to interpret this as news about future oil supply, it is crucial that the
announcements do not contain any new information about other factors such as oil
demand, global economic activity or geopolitical developments. Even though it is
hard to assess whether this is the case or not, looking at how OPEC announcements
are received in the financial press is suggestive as the focus is usually on whether
OPEC could agree on new production quotas or not (see Appendix A.4 for some
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illustrative examples). It should also be noted that these problems are not specific
to the oil market. As is by now well known monetary policy also transmits through
an information channel that conflates high-frequency measures of monetary policy
shocks (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018a; Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco, 2018b; Jaro-
ciński and Karadi, 2020). I will argue that the information channel is, if at all, less
of a problem in the oil market because the informational advantage is less obvious
than in the case of a central bank. Furthermore, OPEC as an organization is very
political and does not respond as systematically to economic developments. How-
ever, to address this concern more rigorously, I construct an informationally robust
surprise series by purging the original series from revisions in OPEC’s global de-
mand forecasts, akin to the refinement of Romer and Romer (2004) in the monetary
policy setting, and show that the results are robust (see Section 5).
To construct the benchmark surprise series, I collected OPEC press releases for
the period 1983-2017. There were a total of 119 announcements made during this
period. An overview of all announcement dates and data sources can be found in
Appendix B. Based on this data, I construct a series of oil supply surprises by taking
the (log) difference of the futures price on the day of the OPEC announcement and






where d and t indicate the day and the month of the announcement, respectively,
and F ht,d is the (log) settlement price of the h-months ahead oil futures contract in
month t on day d.
Standard asset pricing implies that
F ht,d = Et,d[Pt+h] −RP
h
t,d, (2)
where Et,d[Pt+h] is the expected oil price conditional on the information on day d and
RP ht,d is a risk premium (see Pindyck, 2001). Assuming that the risk premium does
not change within the daily window around the announcement, i.e. RP ht,d = RP
h
t,d−1,
we can interpret the surprise as a revision in oil price expectations
Surpriseht,d = Et,d[Pt+h] − Et,d−1[Pt+h] (3)
caused by the respective OPEC announcement.
A crucial choice in high-frequency identification concerns the size of the event
window. There is a trade-off between capturing the entire response to the announce-
ment and background noise, i.e. the threat of other news confounding the response.
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Common window choices range from 30-minutes to multiple days. To balance this
trade-off, I decided to use a daily window. I am not using a 30-minutes window as
is common in the monetary policy literature because of the following reasons. First
and foremost, OPEC does not communicate as clearly as a central bank and markets
usually need some time to process what an announcement means. Second, there are
also practical limitations. Official announcement times are unavailable and even if
they were, often information about OPEC’s decisions gets leaked before the official
announcement. Furthermore, intraday data is only available for the later part of the
sample. However, to mitigate concerns about background noise, I will also present
results from a heteroskedasticity-based approach that allows for background noise
in the surprise series.
Another important issue is the choice of the maturity of the futures contract, h.
Given the implementation lag as well as the horizon of OPEC announcements, ma-
turities ranging from one month to one year are the most natural candidates. These
contracts are also available for a longer time period and are more liquid and less
subject to risk premia (Baumeister and Kilian, 2017). To capture news about future
supply at horizons relevant for OPEC announcements, I use a composite measure
of oil supply surprises spanning the first year of the oil futures term structure. In
particular, I use the first principal component of the surprises based on WTI crude
futures contracts with maturities ranging from one month to one year.5 However, oil
futures prices are highly correlated across maturities and using different contracts
yields very similar results, see Appendix A.4.
The daily surprises, Surpriset,d, are aggregated to a monthly series, Surpriset,
as follows. When there is only one announcement in a given month, the monthly
surprise is equal to the daily one. When there are multiple announcements, the
monthly surprise is the sum of the daily surprises in the given month. When there
is no announcement, the monthly surprise takes zero value.
2.3. Diagnostics of the surprise series
The monthly series of oil supply surprises is shown in Figure 1. In the following, I
perform a number of diagnostic checks regarding the validity of the series, including a
narrative assessment, a placebo exercise to gauge the extent of noise in the series, and
tests concerning autocorrelation, forecastability and correlation with other shocks.
Narrative evidence. It turns out that the series accords quite well with the
narrative account on some key historical episodes. Below, I discuss three specific
5Because OPEC announcements are about future supply, I do not include changes in the spot
price or the front futures price. However, including them does not change the results materially.
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Figure 1: The oil supply surprise series
Notes: This figure shows the oil supply surprise series, constructed as the first principal component
from changes in oil futures prices (using the 1-month to 12-month WTI crude contracts) around
OPEC announcements, scaled to match the average volatility of the underlying price changes.
instances that are of particular interest as they were associated with substantial
revisions in oil price expectations.
On August 5, 1986, OPEC could finally agree on new production quotas after
years of disagreement and lack of compliance. Just before, the oil price plummeted
as Saudi Arabia flooded the markets with oil to make other OPEC members comply
(Roberts, 2005). As we can see, the announcement came as a surprise and led to a
big upward revision of oil price expectations. On November 14, 2001, amid a global
economic slowdown that had been exacerbated by the September 11 terror attacks,
OPEC pledged to cut production but only if other oil producers cut their production
as well. Markets interpreted this announcement as a signal of a potential price war,
which led to a significant downward revision of price expectations (Al-Naimi, 2016).
Another major revision occurred on November 27, 2014 when OPEC announced
that it was leaving oil production levels unchanged. Before, many market observers
had expected OPEC to agree on a cut to oil production in a bid to boost prices.
However, Saudi Arabia blocked calls from some of the poorer OPEC members for
lower quotas, which led to a downward revision of oil price expectations by about
10 percent (Lawler, Bakr, and Zhdannikov, 2014).
Background noise. As discussed above, a potential concern regarding the high-
frequency approach is that other non-oil related news might affect the oil price
during the event window. This concern is particularly relevant since we consider a
one-day event window as opposed to a narrower intraday window.
To gauge the extent of background noise in the surprise series, I compare the
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daily changes in oil futures prices on OPEC announcement days to the price changes
on a sample of control days that do not contain an OPEC announcement but are
comparable on other dimensions (i.e. same weekday and week in the months prior
a given announcement). For an overview of announcement and control dates, see
Table B.1 in the Appendix.
Figure 2: Announcement versus control days
Notes: The figure shows the daily price changes on OPEC announcement and control
days. Left panel: Monthly time series. Right panel: Empirical pdf estimated using
Epanechnikov kernel.
As shown in Figure 2, the price changes are significantly more volatile on an-
nouncement days and also feature some large spikes that are not present in the
control sample. In fact, the variance on announcement days is over 3 times higher
than on control dates, and a Brown–Forsythe test for the equality of group variances
confirms that this difference is highly statistically significant. Another way to see
this is by looking at the probability density function, which displays visibly more
variance and fatter tails on announcement days. However, there still appears to
be non-negligible background noise over the daily event window. This background
noise could bias the results, since there is no way of knowing whether these other
news are oil supply related or other news. In fact, Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a)
show in the monetary policy context that background noise can lead to unreliable
inference and overstate the statistical precision of the estimates—especially if longer
event windows are used. In Section 4.2, I therefore check the sensitivity of the results
when accounting for background noise.
Other diagnostic checks. I also perform a number of additional tests concern-
ing the validity of the oil supply surprise series. Desirable properties are that
it should not be autocorrelated, forecastable nor correlated with other structural
shocks (Ramey, 2016).
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Inspecting the autocorrelation function of the series, I find no evidence for serial
correlation. To check whether macroeconomic variables have any power in fore-
casting the series I run a series of Granger causality tests. I find no evidence that
macroeconomic or financial variables have any forecasting power as all selected vari-
ables do not Granger cause the series at conventional significance levels. To analyze
whether the surprise series is conflated by other structural shocks, I study the corre-
lation with a wide range of different shock measures from the literature. The results
indicate that the oil supply surprise series is not mistakenly picking up global de-
mand, productivity, uncertainty, financial, monetary, or fiscal policy shocks affecting
the oil price. The corresponding figures and tables can be found in Appendix A.1.
Overall, this evidence supports the validity of the oil supply surprise series.
3. Econometric approach
As illustrated above, the oil supply surprise series has many desirable properties.
Nonetheless, it is only an imperfect shock measure because it does not capture all
relevant instances of oil supply news and may be subject to measurement error.
Thus, I will not use it as a direct shock measure but as an instrument. More
specifically, I use it as an external instrument in an otherwise standard oil market
VAR model to identify a structural oil supply news shock, building on a method-
ology developed by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013). An
external instrument is a variable that is correlated with the shock of interest but
not with the other shocks. To account for background noise, I alternatively employ
an heteroskedasticity-based estimator that allows for confounding shocks during the
event window (see Rigobon, 2003; Rigobon and Sack, 2004; Nakamura and Steins-
son, 2018a). The idea is to clean out background noise in the surprise series by
comparing movements in oil futures prices during event windows around OPEC an-
nouncements to other equally long and otherwise similar event windows that do not
contain an OPEC announcement. Identification is then achieved by complement-
ing the VAR residual covariance restrictions with the moment conditions for the
external instrument/heteroskedasticity-based estimator.
An alternative approach would be to directly estimate the dynamic causal effects
using local projections. However, as discussed in Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a),
this can be difficult in the context of high-frequency identification because of a power
problem. Intuitively, macroeconomic variables several periods out in the future are
hit by a myriad of other shocks. At the same time, the oil price is an extremely
volatile variable itself and the high-frequency surprises account only for a small
part of the price fluctuations, rendering the signal-to-noise ratio low. This makes
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it challenging to directly estimate the macroeconomic effects of high-frequency oil
supply surprises without imposing additional structure.6
3.1. Framework
Consider the following reduced-form VAR(p) model
yt = b + B1yt−1 + · · · + Bpyt−p + ut, (4)
where p is the lag order, yt is a n × 1 vector of endogenous variables, ut is a n × 1
vector of reduced-form innovations with covariance matrix Var(ut) = Σ, b is a n×1
vector of constants, and B1, . . . ,Bp are n× n coefficient matrices.
We postulate that the reduced-form innovations are related to the structural
shocks via a linear mapping
ut = Sεt, (5)
where S is a non-singular, n × n structural impact matrix and εt is a n × 1 vector
of structural shocks. By definition, the structural shocks are mutually uncorrelated,
i.e. Var(εt) = Ω is diagonal. From the linear mapping of the shocks we have
Σ = SΩS′. (6)
Without loss of generality, let us denote the oil supply news shock as the first shock
in the VAR, ε1,t. Our aim is to identify the structural impact vector s1, which
corresponds to the first column of S.
External instruments approach. Under the assumption that the background
noise in the surprise series is negligible, we can identify the structural impact vector
using the external instruments approach. Identification with external instruments
(or “proxies”) works as follows. Suppose there is an external instrument available,
zt. In the application at hand, zt is the oil supply surprise series. For zt to be a
valid instrument, we need
E[ztε1,t] = α 6= 0 (7)
E[ztε2:n,t] = 0, (8)
6In Appendix A.2, I show that the results based on local projections using the oil supply surprise
series are, at least qualitatively, robust when controlling for enough lags. However, as expected,
the estimates are more erratic and less precisely estimated.
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where ε1,t is the oil supply news shock and ε2:n,t is a (n − 1) × 1 vector consisting
of the other structural shocks. Assumption (7) is the relevance requirement and as-
sumption (8) is the exogeneity condition. Under assumptions (7)-(8), s1 is identified
up to sign and scale:
s̃2:n,1 ≡ s2:n,1/s1,1 = E[ztu2:n,t]/E[ztu1,t], (9)
provided that E[ztu1,t] 6= 0. Note that s̃2:n,1 can be thought of as the population ana-
logue of the IV estimator of u2:n,t on u1,t using zt as an instrument. The structural
impact vector is s1 = (s1,1, s̃
′
2,1s1,1)
′. The scale s1,1 is then set by a normalization
subject to Σ = SΩS′. One approach is to set Ω = In, which implies that a unit pos-
itive value of ε1,t has a one standard deviation positive effect on y1,t. Alternatively,
we can set Ω = diag(σ2ε1 , . . . , σ
2
εn
) and s1,1 = x, which implies that a unit positive
value of ε1,t has a positive effect of magnitude x on y1,t. To facilitate interpretation,
I use the latter normalization such that the shock corresponds to a 10 percent in-
crease in the price of oil. Having obtained the impact vector, it is straightforward
to compute all objects of interest such as IRFs, FEVDs, the structural shock series
and historical decompositions. For more information, see Appendix C.
Heteroskedasticity-based approach. We can also identify the structural im-
pact vector under weaker assumptions, allowing for the presence of other shocks
contaminating the instrument over the daily event window. Suppose that move-
ments in the oil futures zt we observe in the data are governed by both oil supply
news and other shocks:




where εj,t are other shocks affecting oil futures and vt ∼ iidN(0, σ
2
v) captures mea-
surement error such as microstructure noise. Because zt is also affected by other
shocks, it is no longer a valid external instrument. However, we can still identify
the structural impact vector by exploiting the heteroskedasticity in the data.
The identifying assumption is that the variance of oil supply news shocks in-
creases at the time of OPEC announcements while the variance of all other shocks
is unchanged. Define R1 as a sample of OPEC announcement dates and R2 as a
sample of trading days that do not contain an OPEC announcement but are com-
parable on other dimensions. R1 can be thought of as the treatment and R2 as the
control sample (see Section 2.3 for more information and some descriptive statis-
tics of the instrument in the treatment and the control sample). The identifying
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σ2εj ,R1 = σ
2
εj ,R2




Under these assumptions, the structural impact vector is given by
s1 =
ER1[ztut] − ER2[ztut]




As shown by Rigobon and Sack (2004), we can also obtain this estimator through
an IV approach, using z̃ = (z′R1, −z
′
R2)
′ as an instrument in a regression of the
reduced-form innovations on z = (z′R1, z
′
R2)
′. See Appendix D for more details.
Reassuringly, the heteroskedasticity-based estimator produces similar results, sup-
porting the validity of the external instruments approach (see Section 4.2).
Additional assumptions. Apart from the identifying restrictions discussed
above, there are other important assumptions underlying the VAR approach (Naka-
mura and Steinsson, 2018b). A crucial assumption is invertibility, i.e. that the
VAR contains all the relevant information to recover the structural shocks.7 Non-
invertibility is essentially an omitted variable bias problem. If the model does not
span the relevant information, some endogenous variation may be falsely attributed
to exogenous oil supply news shocks. In Section 5.1, I analyze how the results de-
pend on the information contained in the VAR. I do not find any evidence that the
model is informationally insufficient.
Computing impulse responses using the VAR involves additional assumptions.
For the responses to be valid, the model has to be an adequate representation of
the dynamics of all variables in the system. To analyze how restrictive the dynamic
VAR structure is, I alternatively compute the impulse responses to the identified oil
supply news shock using local projections à la Jordà (2005). This involves running







hxt−1 + ξi,t,h, (12)
where yi,t+h is the outcome variable of interest, Shockt = ε̂1,t is the oil supply news
7This is the assumption behind (5), which requires that the shocks can be recovered from current
and lagged values of the observed data. Identification in VARs with external instruments requires
weaker assumptions. In particular, only the shock of interest has to be invertible and the instrument
has to satisfy a limited lead-lag exogeneity condition (Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco, 2018a).
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shock identified from the external instruments VAR, xt−1 is a vector of controls and
ξi,t,h is a potentially serially correlated error term. ψ
i
h is the impulse response to the
oil supply news shock of variable i at horizon h.8 Using the shock identified from
the VAR instead of the high-frequency oil supply surprises directly alleviates the
challenges regarding statistical power discussed above, as the shock is consistently
observed and spans the full sample going back to the 1970s. In Section 4.2, I compare
the responses estimated from the VAR and the local projections approach and show
that they produce comparable results.
3.2. Comparison to alternative strategies
Traditionally, oil supply shocks are thought of as sudden disruptions in the current
availability of oil, causing an immediate fall in oil supply, an increase in the oil price
and a depletion of inventories. A long literature identified such shocks using different
techniques, ranging from the construction of narrative shock series (Hamilton, 2003;
Kilian, 2008; Caldara, Cavallo, and Iacoviello, 2019) to SVAR models of the oil
market (Kilian, 2009; Kilian and Murphy, 2012; Baumeister and Hamilton, 2019).
This paper proposes a novel focus: oil supply news shocks, i.e. expectational
shocks about future oil supply. As is well known from the news literature, such
shocks can have very different effects from surprise shocks (Beaudry and Portier,
2014). In particular, we would expect that a negative oil supply news shock has a
positive effect on the oil price while oil production does not respond significantly
on impact but only decreases with a lag. Most importantly, the shock should lead
to an increase in oil inventories. This is the key distinguishing feature between
oil supply news and surprise shocks. If a shortfall in production happens today,
market players will immediately draw down inventories to make up for the shortage
in supply. In contrast, if market players expect a shortfall in the future, they will
build up inventories today to make sure that they have oil when the shortfall occurs.
The positive inventory response conforms well with a literature that aims at
identifying shocks to the inventory demand for oil (Kilian and Murphy, 2014; Juvenal
and Petrella, 2015). The idea behind these studies is that otherwise unobservable
shifts in expectations about future oil market conditions must be reflected in the
demand for oil inventories. A positive inventory demand shock will shift the demand
for oil inventories, causing inventories and the oil price to increase in equilibrium.
It is precisely the positive inventory response that makes it possible to disentangle
inventory demand from other oil demand and supply shocks in sign-identified VARs.
8As controls, I use one lag of the outcome variables of interest to deal with non-stationarity in
the data. To compute the confidence bands, I use a parametric bootstrap as in Stock and Watson
(2018), accounting for the fact that the oil supply news shock is a generated regressor.
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Such inventory demand shocks, however, are a composite of expectations-driven
shocks without a clear attribution as to where the shift in expectations is coming
from. They capture, among other things, news about future demand and supply,
changes in uncertainty, or sentiments (Kilian and Murphy, 2014). With existing
techniques, it has not been possible to disentangle the various expectations-driven
components. Augmenting the model by oil futures prices would also not help in this
respect, as the futures prices are inherently linked to inventories via an arbitrage
condition (Hamilton, 2009; Alquist and Kilian, 2010). It is only the combination of
the unique institutional setting of OPEC in combination with high-frequency data
that allows me to isolate news about future oil supply.
3.3. Empirical specification
The baseline specification includes six variables: The real price of oil, world oil pro-
duction, world oil inventories, world industrial production, U.S. industrial produc-
tion and the U.S. consumer price index (CPI).9 The first four variables are standard
in oil market VAR models. I augment these core variables by the two U.S. variables
to analyze the effects on the U.S. economy. The data is monthly and spans the
period 1974M1 to 2017M12. A detailed overview on the data and its sources can
be found in Appendix B.2. Following Gertler and Karadi (2015), I use a shorter
sample for identification, namely 1983M4 to 2017M12. This is because the futures
data used to construct the instrument is only available for this period. The moti-
vation for using a longer sample for estimation is to get more precise estimates of
the reduced-form coefficients. I estimate the VAR in log levels. The lag order is set
to 12 and in terms of deterministics only a constant term is included. However, the
results turn out the be robust with respect to all of these choices, see Appendix A.4.
4. Results
4.1. First stage
The main identifying assumption behind the external instruments approach is that
the instrument is correlated with the structural shock of interest but uncorrelated
with all other structural shocks. However, even if this holds, standard inference
will not produce reliable results when the instrument and the shock are only weakly
9As the oil price indicator, I use the WTI spot price, deflated by U.S. CPI. For world industrial
production, I use Baumeister and Hamilton’s (2019) index for OECD countries and six other major
economies. The results are robust if I use Kilian’s (2009) global activity indicator. For world oil
inventories, I use a measure based on OECD petroleum stocks, as proposed by Kilian and Murphy
(2014). To get rid of the seasonal variation, I perform an adjustment using the Census X13 method.
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correlated. In a first step, it is thus important to test the strength of the instrument.
This can be done using an F-test in the first-stage regression of the oil price residual
from the VAR on the instrument (see Montiel-Olea, Stock, and Watson, 2016). To
be confident that a weak instrument problem is not present, they recommend a
threshold value of 10 for the corresponding F-statistic.
Table 1: Tests on instrument strength
1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 12M COMP
Coefficient 0.946 0.981 1.016 1.070 1.123 1.098 1.085
F-stat 24.37 24.25 24.33 22.90 22.35 13.58 22.67
F-stat (robust) 12.01 11.86 11.92 11.32 11.11 7.49 10.55
R2 4.53 4.51 4.52 4.27 4.17 2.57 4.22
R2 (adjusted) 4.34 4.32 4.33 4.08 3.98 2.38 4.04
Observations 516 516 516 516 516 516 516
Notes: The table shows the results of the first-stage regressions of the oil price residual û1,t
on the proxies based on different futures contracts as well as the composite measure span-
ning the first year of the term structure. F-statistics above 10 indicate strong instruments.
Robust F-statistics allow for heteroskedasticity.
Table 1 presents the results on this test for a selection of instruments based on fu-
tures contracts with different maturities and the composite measure. In addition to
the standard F-statistic, I also report a robust F-statistic allowing for heteroskedas-
ticity. The instruments turn out to be strong with F-statistics safely above the
threshold of 10. However, the strength of the instruments tends to decrease with
the maturity of the futures contract. For my baseline, the composite measure span-
ning the first year of the term structure, the F-statistic is 22.7 and the instrument
explains about 4.2 percent of the oil price residual. Overall, this evidence suggests
that there is no weak instrument problem at hand.
4.2. Effects on the oil market and the macroeconomy
I present now the results from the baseline model, identified using the external
instruments approach. Figure 3 shows the impulse responses to the identified oil
supply news shock, normalized to increase the real oil price by 10 percent. As all
variables are in logs, the responses can be interpreted as elasticities. The solid black
lines are the point estimates and the shaded areas are 68 and 90 percent confidence
bands based on 10,000 bootstrap replications.10
10To compute the confidence bands I use a moving block bootstrap, as proposed by Jentsch and
Lunsford (2019). This method produces asymptotically valid confidence bands under fairly mild
α-mixing conditions. The block size is set to 24 and to deal with the difference in the estimation
and identification samples, I censor the missing values in the proxy to zero.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to an oil supply news shock
Notes: Impulse responses to an oil supply news shock, normalized to increase the real
price of oil by 10 percent on impact. The solid line is the point estimate and the dark and
light shaded areas are 68 and 90 percent confidence bands, respectively.
A negative oil supply news shock leads to a significant, immediate increase in the
price of oil. World oil production does not change significantly on impact but then
starts to fall sluggishly and persistently. World oil inventories increase significantly
and persistently. The large positive response of the oil price together with the
gradual decrease of oil production and the positive inventory response are consistent
with the interpretation of a news shock about future oil supply. World industrial
production does not change much over the first year after the shock but then starts
to fall significantly and persistently. This is in line with the notion that oil exporting
countries might benefit in the short run from higher oil prices before the adverse
general equilibrium effects kick in.
The rise in inventories turns out to be somewhat more persistent than expected.
As oil production starts falling, we may expect that some of the accumulated inven-
tories get depleted. In contrast, inventories turn out to be elevated for an extended
period. A potential explanation for this finding are speculative or precautionary mo-
tives. It is conceivable that negative oil supply news shocks are perceived as a signal
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for further negative news in the future, which would lead to an overaccumulation of
inventories.11
Turning to the U.S. economy, we can see that the shock leads to a fall in industrial
production that is deeper and seems to materialize more quickly compared to the
world benchmark. This is in line with the fact that the U.S. has historically been
one of the biggest net oil importers and thus particularly vulnerable to higher oil
prices. Finally, U.S. consumer prices increase significantly on impact and continue
to rise for about one year before converging back to normal. The response is highly
statistically significant and features a considerable degree of persistence.
At the peak of the responses, an oil supply news shock raising the oil price by 10
percent today decreases future oil production by -0.7 percent, increases inventories
by 1.2 percent, decreases world and U.S. industrial production by -0.6 and -1 percent,
respectively, and increases U.S. consumer prices by 0.4 percent. Thus, oil supply
news shocks have effects that are also economically significant.
Accounting for background noise. To analyze the role of background noise, I
also present results from the heteroskedasticity-based approach. As shown in Section
2.3, the variance on OPEC announcement days is over 3 times higher than on other
comparable trading days and this difference is highly statistically significant. It is
exactly this shift in variance that can be exploited for identification, assuming that
the shift is driven by the oil supply news shock.12
The results from the heteroskedasticity-based approach are shown in the top
panel of Figure 4. The impulse responses turn out to be similar to the responses
from the external instruments approach: the point estimates are very close to the
baseline case, however, all responses turn out to be less precisely estimated. These
results suggest that the bias induced by background noise is likely negligible in the
present application. However, part of the statistical strength under the external
instruments approach appears to come from the stronger identifying assumptions.
The finding that the external instruments and the heteroskedasticity-based ap-
proach lead to such similar conclusions may be a bit surprising given the non-trivial
background noise documented in Figure 2. A potential explanation for this finding
could be that the background noise may in fact largely reflect variation in market
beliefs about future oil supply announcements. Alternatively, a large part of the
11Also note that a significant part of global oil inventories are strategic petroleum reserves. As
such, their behavior does likely not reflect purely commercial motives as these strategic reserves
are under government control.
12Because the change in variance appears to be large and significant enough, I rely on standard
inference and compute the confidence bands using a moving block bootstrap as in the external
instruments case. This is also confirmed by looking at the first-stage F-statistic which lies again
safely above the threshold of 10.
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Panel A: Heteroskedasticity-based identification
Panel B: Local projections on oil supply news shock
Figure 4: Background noise and dynamic VAR structure
Notes: Impulse responses to an oil supply news shock. Panel A: Identification based on
heteroskedasticity (black) and external instruments (red). Panel B: Impulse responses
estimated using local projections (black) and VAR (red). The shock is normalized to
increase the real price of oil by 10 percent on impact. The solid lines are the point estimates
and the shaded areas (and dashed/dotted lines) are 68 and 90 percent confidence bands,
respectively.
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identification may be driven by large shocks and thus, the background noise, while
significant in an average sense, turns out to be largely inconsequential. In Appendix
A.2, I provide some suggestive evidence for these explanations.
Local projections. As discussed in Section 3, an important assumption behind
the VAR approach is that the model is an adequate representation of the dynamic
relationships governing the data. Because I am identifying a news shock, many of
the impact responses are close to zero. Thus, a significant part of the longer-run
dynamics may come from the underlying VAR structure (Nakamura and Steinsson,
2018b). To analyze to what extent the results are driven by this structure, I compute
the responses to the identified oil supply news shock using local projections.
The results are presented in the bottom panel of Figure 4. Reassuringly, the two
approaches to estimate the impulse responses yield comparable results. As expected,
the responses based on local projections are more erratic as we do not impose any
dynamic restrictions across impulse horizons. At shorter horizons, the responses
are virtually identical. At longer horizons, the local projection responses are less
persistent and less precisely estimated.
Discussion. The above findings illustrate that oil supply news shocks are quite
different from the previously identified oil supply shocks (see e.g. Kilian and Murphy,
2012; Baumeister and Hamilton, 2019). In particular, oil supply news shocks lead
to a significant and persistent increase in inventories and a sluggish but significant
fall in oil production. This stands in stark contrast to the negative response of
inventories and the strong, immediate fall in oil production that is observed after
unanticipated oil supply shocks. It is important to note that this result emerges
naturally as my identification strategy does not restrict the signs of the responses
in any way.
The significant oil price response together with the positive inventory response
conforms well with the literature on inventory demand shocks. Importantly, how-
ever, oil supply news shocks also lead to a gradual decrease of future oil production—
consistent with the interpretation that these shocks capture expectations about fu-
ture supply shortfalls. In contrast, the medium- to long-run oil production response
to inventory demand shocks is unclear a priori, as these shocks are a composite
of different expectational shocks, and the empirical evidence is mixed (Kilian and
Murphy, 2014; Juvenal and Petrella, 2015; Baumeister and Hamilton, 2019).
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4.3. Oil supply news as a driver of the real price of oil
As we have seen, oil supply news shocks can have powerful effects on the economy
even if current oil production does not move. However, an equally interesting ques-
tion is how important oil supply news are in explaining historical episodes in oil
markets. To analyze this question, I perform a historical decomposition of the oil
price.
Figure 5: Historical decomposition of the real price of oil
Notes: The table shows the cumulative historical contribution of oil supply news shocks
to the real price of oil and the 68 and 90 percent confidence bands together with the
actual real price of oil (in percent deviations from mean). The vertical bars indicate
major events in oil markets, notably the outbreak of the Iranian revolution in 1978M9,
the start of the Iran–Iraq war in 1980M9, the collapse of OPEC in 1985M12, the outbreak
of the Persian Gulf war in 1990M8, the Asian financial crisis of 1997M7, the Venezuelan
crisis in 2002M11, the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008M9 and the recent
collapse of the oil price starting in 2014M6.
Figure 5 shows the cumulative historical contribution of oil supply news shocks to
the real price of oil together with the actual real price of oil for the period 1975-2017.
It is important to stress in this context that the decomposition does not capture the
contribution of all oil supply news on historical oil prices; it only captures the part
that correlates with OPEC production announcements. Despite this caveat, we can
immediately see from the figure that oil supply news shocks—in the sense of this
paper—have contributed meaningfully to historical variations in the price of oil.
It is instructive to focus on specific episodes. For example, the rapid rise in
the oil price in the late 1970s after the Iranian Revolution turns out to be strongly
driven by lower oil supply expectations. Developments in the Middle East, such as
Khomeini’s arrival in Iran or the Iranian hostage crisis, fueled expectations of a war
and the destruction of oil fields in the region. These expectational effects peaked
prior to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and then subsided in the early 1980s.
Similarly, the sharp drop in the oil price in late 1985 when OPEC essentially
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collapsed was mainly driven by higher supply expectations. This is also consistent
with the notion that the OPEC breakdown was initially perceived irreversible. We
can also see that OPEC’s attempts to reunite in 1986-1987 lowered oil supply ex-
pectations, which in turn contributed to the partial reversal of the oil price. The
spike in the real price of oil in 1990–1991 after the invasion of Kuwait can also at
least partially be explained by negative oil supply news.
Subsequently, the contribution of supply expectations had been more muted up
until the Asian crisis of 1997–1998, when the real price of oil fell to an all-time
low. Oil supply expectations have contributed quite significantly to this fall and the
subsequent reverse amid OPEC’s efforts to coordinate production (see Yergin, 2011,
for more information on these episodes).
In contrast, oil supply news did not contribute significantly to the surge in the
real price of oil between 2003 and mid-2008, which has been mainly attributed to
higher global demand (Kilian, 2009). However, oil supply news also played a role in
more recent years. For instance, a significant part of the collapse in oil prices starting
in June 2014 can be attributed to higher oil supply expectations, as Saudi Arabia
announced its intention not to counter the increasing supply from other producers
and OPEC subsequently decided to maintain their production ceiling in spite of the
increasing glut (Arezki and Blanchard, 2015).
These results show that political events in the Middle East affect the real price
of oil not only through changes in current supply but also, and perhaps more im-
portantly, through changes in supply expectations. This finding is important as it
speaks to the debate on the role of demand and supply shocks driving the price of
oil.
4.4. Wider effects and propagation channels
To get a better understanding of how oil supply news shocks transmit to the macroe-
conomy, I analyze the effects on a wide range of macroeconomic and financial vari-
ables. To compute the impulse responses, I augment the baseline VAR by one vari-
able at a time.13 This also allows me to gauge the importance of various propagation
channels.
13This is a flexible approach to estimate the effects on a wide range of variables without resorting
to shrinkage techniques (Beaudry and Portier, 2014; Gertler and Karadi, 2015). If possible, the
augmented VARs are estimated on the same sample as the baseline. If the series does not span the
original sample, I adjust the sample accordingly. Some variables are only available at the quarterly
frequency. To map out the responses of these variables, I use a quarterly version of the VAR (see
also Section 5). Information on data sources and coverage can be found in Appendix B.2.
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Expectations and uncertainty. Oil supply news are shocks to oil supply expec-
tations. As such, we would expect that they strongly propagate through expecta-
tional variables such as oil price and inflation expectations. This turns out to be the
case. The top panel of Figure 6 shows the responses of oil price and inflation ex-
pectations over the following year. Both measures increase significantly. The effects
are particularly pronounced for oil price expectations but the effects on inflation
expectations are also significant, in line with recent evidence by Wong (2015).
Panel A: Expectations
Panel B: Uncertainty
Figure 6: Expectations versus uncertainty
Notes: Responses of different measures of expectations (Panel A) and uncertainty (Panel
B). The oil price expectations are from Baumeister and Kilian (2017) and the inflation
expectations from the Michigan Surveys of Consumers (median). Both series capture
expectations over the next 12 months. Financial uncertainty is measured by the VXO
index from Bloom (2009) and the GPR index is from Caldara and Iacoviello (2018).
In the bottom panel of Figure 6, I show the responses of different measures of
uncertainty, including financial uncertainty and geopolitical risk.14 Interestingly,
the uncertainty measures are not strongly affected: financial uncertainty does not
respond at all while geopolitical risks increase slightly in the short run but the
response is barely significant. The strong response of price expectations together
14The ideal variable would be a measure of oil price uncertainty. Unfortunately, such a measure
is unavailable for a long enough sample and thus, I use the VXO and geopolitical risk as proxies.
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with the muted effects on uncertainty is consistent with the interpretation of a
news shock. In contrast, for uncertainty shocks, which can have similar effects to
news shocks (see Alquist and Kilian, 2010), we would expect a stronger response of
uncertainty indicators and no expected changes on future oil production.
The results on inflation expectations are of particular interest because of their
central role for macroeconomic policy. However, measuring inflation expectations
is challenging. An alternative to the Michigan survey is the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF), which captures expectations of professional forecasters as op-
posed to households. Analyzing potential differences between these measures is in-
teresting. Unfortunately, the SPF data is only available at the quarterly frequency.
To allow for better comparison, I also aggregate the monthly expectations from the
Michigan survey and compute the responses from the augmented quarterly models.
Figure 7: Inflation expectations
Figure 7 shows that the effects differ quite substantially among the two mea-
sures. In line with the monthly evidence, household inflation expectations increase
significantly. In contrast, the response of inflation expectation of professional fore-
casters turns out to be much weaker. These findings are consistent with Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2015), who show that a large part of the historical differences
in inflation forecasts between households and professionals can be attributed to oil
prices. They also speak to a recent literature ascribing an important role to oil prices
in explaining inflation dynamics via their effects on inflation expectations (Coibion,
Gorodnichenko, and Kamdar, 2018; Hasenzagl et al., 2018).
Consumer prices. Oil supply news shocks lead to a significant and persistent in-
crease in consumer prices. How much of this increase is driven by energy prices and
how are other price categories affected? Figure 8 shows the responses of different
components of the CPI, including the core, energy, non-durables, durables, and ser-
vices components, together with the headline response from the baseline model. As
expected, energy prices respond strongly. The response is front-loaded and mirrors
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the oil price response. In contrast, core consumer prices do not react significantly
in the short run but then start to rise persistently as well.
Figure 8: Consumer prices
While I find that all price categories increase significantly, the pass-through
is relatively weak quantitatively for most categories. For headline CPI, the pass-
through (measured at the peak) is about 4.5 percent, which is in line with previous
findings in the literature (see e.g. Gao, Kim, and Saba, 2014). The pass-through is
strongest for the energy component, standing at about 35 percent after one year,
followed by non-durables (9 percent), durables (2 percent) and services (2 percent).
The pass-through turns out to be very quick for energy prices and non-durables but
takes longer to materialize for durables and services.
Economic activity. Oil supply news shocks also lead to a significant fall in in-
dustrial production. However, industrial production is but one measure of economic
activity. To get a broader picture of how the shock affects the economy, I study
the responses of a number of monthly and quarterly activity indicators, including
the unemployment rate, personal consumption expenditures (PCE), as well as real
GDP, investment and consumption. Figure 9 shows the responses together with the
response of industrial production from the baseline model.
Oil supply news shocks have significant effects on economic activity, broadly
defined. From the monthly indicators, we can see that the unemployment rate rises
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Panel A: Monthly indicators
Panel B: Quarterly indicators
Figure 9: Economic activity
significantly and personal consumption expenditures fall persistently. These adverse
economic effects are confirmed by looking at the quarterly measures. Real GDP,
investment and consumption all fall, even though the quarterly responses are a bit
less precisely estimated. Quantitatively, investment falls by more than consumption,
consistent with consumption smoothing behavior on the part of the households.
These results support the notion that a primary transmission channel of oil price
shocks is via a reduction in consumption and investment demand, i.e. by disrupting
consumers’ and firms’ spending on goods and services other than energy (Hamilton,
2008; Edelstein and Kilian, 2009). This is confirmed by looking at the responses
of different categories of consumption expenditures: consumers significantly cut ex-
penditures on goods and services other than energy as well, likely because of the
decrease in discretionary income caused by higher energy prices (see Figure A.7
in the Appendix). The rise in unemployment may also point to some reallocation
frictions in the labor market, further amplifying the recessionary effects (Hamilton,
1988; Davis and Haltiwanger, 2001).
Monetary policy and financial markets. How does monetary policy respond
to oil supply news given the significant effects on consumer prices and economic
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activity? Figure 10 shows the response of the federal funds rate. The monetary
policy stance does not change significantly on impact and only starts tightening
after about a year when core consumer prices start rising. However, the response is
barely significant, reflecting the policy trade-off that the inflationary pressures paired
with the economic downturn introduce. The sluggish, weakly positive response is
consistent with the notion that the Fed follows a monetary reaction function placing
a positive weight on inflation and a positive but smaller weight on output.
Figure 10: Monetary policy and financial markets
To analyze whether oil supply news also transmit through financial channels, I
study the responses of stock and credit markets. The stock market takes a significant
hit as the expected fall in demand decreases future cash flows. Interestingly, however,
the S&P 500 index only falls gradually. To examine this further, I analyze the stock
price response for a selection of different industries. At the industry level, I find
more of an immediate response. There is also significant heterogeneity: while the
utility sector booms in the short run, the automobile, retail and transportation
industries fall immediately and persistently (see Figure A.8 in the Appendix). This
underlying heterogeneity may explain the sluggish fall observed in the composite
index. Credit markets, on the other hand, do not seem to be significantly affected.
Credit conditions, as measured by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek’s (2012) excess bond
premium, remain broadly unchanged. Thus, oil supply news shocks do not seem to
have further amplifying effects through a financial accelerator channel.
A potential concern in this context is that monetary policy may contaminate the
baseline results, given how temporally correlated oil and monetary policy shocks are
in certain periods of time (Hoover and Perez, 1994). Reassuringly, controlling for
the federal funds rate does not affect the baseline responses materially. Moreover,
the oil supply surprise series turns out to be uncorrelated with standard measures of
monetary policy shocks (see Figure A.9 and Table A.3 in the Appendix). Thus, the
high-frequency approach appears to be successful in disentangling such episodes.
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Exchange rates and trade. Because the U.S. dollar is the world’s reserve cur-
rency, most of the crude oil is priced and traded in dollars. Thus, it is only natural
to suspect a tight link between the two variables.
Figure 11 displays the responses for the narrow and broad U.S. nominal effective
exchange rate together with a selection of bilateral exchange rates. Oil supply news
shocks lead to a significant depreciation of the dollar. While the depreciation of the
narrow effective exchange rate appears to be temporary and tends to reverse after
about one and a half years, the broad effective exchange rate depreciates persistently.
Panel A: Effective exchange rates
Panel B: Bilateral exchange rates
Figure 11: Nominal exchange rates
Notes: Responses of nominal effective (Panel A) and bilateral exchange rates (Panel B).
All exchange rates are defined such that an increase corresponds to an appreciation of
the U.S. dollar. The narrow index includes Euro area, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom,
Switzerland, Australia, and Sweden. The broad index also includes Mexico, China, Tai-
wan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Brazil, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia,
India, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile and Colombia.
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An analysis of bilateral exchange rates reveals that these differences are likely
driven by heterogeneities between the currencies of net oil importing and exporting
countries, as the broad index includes some of the major oil producing nations. While
the currencies of major oil importers, such as the Euro area or Japan, appreciate
against the dollar in the short run but then tend to depreciate in the longer run, the
currencies of major oil exporters, such as Russia, Mexico or Indonesia, appreciate
persistently, in line with previous findings by Lizardo and Mollick (2010). Overall,
these results help to reconcile the strong negative correlation between oil prices and
the dollar (Klitgaard, Pesenti, and Wang, 2019).
Since the U.S. has historically been one of the major oil importers, we would
also expect that the shock leads to a significant deterioration of the terms of trade.
This intuition is confirmed. As shown in the left panel of Figure 12, the U.S. terms
of trade deteriorates significantly and persistently. This result supports the notion
that oil price shocks transmit as shocks to the terms of trade and also helps to
reconcile the significant fall in consumption expenditures documented above (see
also Baumeister, Kilian, and Zhou, 2018, for a discussion of this point).
Figure 12: Trade
The significant depreciation together with the impaired terms of trade likely
have an effect on the balance of trade. The right panel of Figure 12 depicts the
merchandise trade balance as a share of nominal GDP. As expected, the shock leads
to a significant trade deficit for about a year. This is an additional channel through
which oil supply news shocks affect demand. Quantitatively, however, this channel
appears to be less important than the decrease in consumption and investment.
4.5. Quantitative importance
As shown above, oil supply news shocks have significant effects on economic activity
and prices. Another important question is: how much of the historical variation
in these variables can oil supply news account for? To analyze this, I augment the
31
baseline VAR by a selection of key U.S. variables, i.e. the broad nominal effective
exchange rate, the federal funds rate, the VXO, and the terms of trade and perform
a forecast error variance decomposition.
Table 2 presents the results. We can see that oil supply news shocks account for
a large part of the variance in oil prices, especially in the short run. Furthermore,
they explain a non-negligible portion of the variation in world oil production and
inventories at longer horizons. In contrast, the contribution to world industrial
production turns out to be smaller. One reason for this could be that the positive
effects on oil exporting countries and the negative effects on oil importing countries
offset each other to a certain extent.
Table 2: Forecast error variance decomposition
Global variables and exchange rates:
Oil price Oil production Oil inventories World IP NEER
0 0.68 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.12
[0.20, 0.88] [0.00, 0.12] [0.00, 0.28] [0.00, 0.19] [0.00, 0.43]
12 0.39 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.21
[0.09, 0.63] [0.01, 0.11] [0.01, 0.29] [0.00, 0.08] [0.03, 0.51]
24 0.35 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.26
[0.09, 0.60] [0.02, 0.22] [0.02, 0.41] [0.00, 0.09] [0.05, 0.54]
48 0.32 0.12 0.21 0.05 0.24
[0.09, 0.58] [0.04, 0.30] [0.03, 0.53] [0.01, 0.18] [0.05, 0.52]
U.S. variables:
IP CPI FFR VXO TOT
0 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.15
[0.00, 0.33] [0.00, 0.38] [0.00, 0.03] [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.42]
12 0.05 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.41
[0.00, 0.25] [0.02, 0.46] [0.00, 0.02] [0.00, 0.02] [0.12, 0.64]
24 0.07 0.15 0.04 0.02 0.36
[0.01, 0.28] [0.02, 0.45] [0.01, 0.12] [0.00, 0.06] [0.12, 0.57]
48 0.19 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.33
[0.04, 0.43] [0.02, 0.38] [0.01, 0.10] [0.01, 0.05] [0.12, 0.53]
Notes: The table shows the forecast error variance of the key global and U.S. variables
explained by oil supply news shocks at horizons 0, 12, 24, and 48 months. The 90 percent
confidence intervals are displayed in brackets.
Turning to the U.S. variables, I find that oil supply news shocks explain a mean-
ingful portion of the variation in economic activity and prices. While the shocks
account for a rather low share of the variation in industrial production in the short
run, they explain a non-negligible share at longer horizons. They also explain a sig-
nificant portion of the variance in the CPI. At the one year horizon, the contribution
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is close to 20 percent. They also explain a significant share of the effective exchange
rate and the terms of trade. In contrast, the contributions to the fed funds rate and
the VXO turn out to be negligible.
Taking stock. The evidence presented in this section points to a strong expecta-
tional channel in the oil market. Even if big suppliers such as OPEC cannot simply
set the price as a cartel in the traditional sense, they can exert significant influence
over oil prices by affecting expectations about future supply. These expectational
shocks in turn can have significant effects on the macroeconomy and contribute
meaningfully to historical variations in economic activity and prices.
5. Sensitivity analysis
In this section, I perform a comprehensive series of robustness checks. In particular,
I perform some additional tests regarding the identification strategy and analyze the
sensitivity with respect to the model specification and data choices. Some further
checks and all corresponding tables and figures can be found in Appendix A.
5.1. Identification
Announcements. To be able to interpret the identified shock as a news shock
about future supply, it is crucial that the announcements do not contain any new
information about other factors and global demand in particular. To address this
concern, I construct an informationally robust oil supply surprise series, following
a strategy that has been previously employed in the monetary literature (Romer
and Romer, 2004; Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco, 2018b). To this end, I collected
global oil demand forecasts from OPEC monthly oil market reports.15 The idea is to
purge the raw oil supply surprise series from potential contamination stemming from
OPEC’s informational advantage on the global oil demand outlook using revisions
in OPEC’s global oil demand forecasts around conference meetings. More precisely,
the informationally robust surprise series, IRSt, is constructed based on the residual
of the following regression:










m yq+j − F
opec
m−1yq+j] + IRSm, (13)
15These reports are available online in pdf format (https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/
publications/338.htm) and contain among other things OPEC’s global oil demand forecasts and
forecast revisions. For more information, see Appendix A.4.
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where m is the month of the meeting, q denotes the corresponding quarter, yq is
global oil demand growth in quarter q and F opecm yq+j is the OPEC forecast for quarter
q+j made in month m. F opecm yq+j −F
opec
m−1yq+j is the revised forecast for yq+j.
16 Note
that because the monthly reports are only available from 2001, the informationally
robust surprise series spans a shorter sample.
Figure A.11 in the Appendix depicts the results using the baseline and the in-
formationally robust instrument. The responses are very similar apart from a few
minor, statistically insignificant differences. These results suggest that there is no
strong information channel confounding high-frequency oil supply surprises.
Another concern is that many of the OPEC conference meetings were extraordi-
nary meetings scheduled in response to macroeconomic or geopolitical developments.
This might induce an endogeneity problem if markets do not have enough time to
form expectations about the oil market outlook prior to the announcements. To
address this concern, I only use the announcements from ordinary meetings sched-
uled well in advance. The responses, shown in Figure A.12, turn out to be very
similar. However, the instrument turns out to be weaker as about 40 percent of the
announcements had to be dropped, leaving less variation for identification.
News and surprise shocks. The crucial assumption behind the external instru-
ments approach is that the instrument is correlated with the structural shock of
interest but uncorrelated with all other shocks. This condition might be violated
when the oil supply surprise series does not only correlate with the oil supply news
shock but also with the unanticipated oil supply shock. To investigate this con-
cern, I identify the oil supply news and the surprise shock jointly. To this end, I
use Kilian’s (2008) production shortfall series17 and my oil supply surprise series
as instruments. In the case with two shocks and two instruments, the instrument
moment restrictions are not sufficient. To achieve identification, I have to impose
one additional restriction. I assume that the oil supply news shock does not affect
oil production within the first month.18
The results are shown in Figure A.13. The response to the news shock is very
similar to the baseline, suggesting that we can identify the oil supply news shock
without controlling for the surprise shock. The responses for the oil supply surprise
shock look quite reasonable as well: it leads to a temporary increase in the oil price, a
significant, immediate fall in oil production and a persistent decrease in inventories.
16In computing the forecast revisions, the forecast horizons for meetings m and m−1 are adjusted
so that the forecasts refer to the same quarter.
17More specifically, I use the extended version by Bastianin and Manera (2018).
18This can be justified with the 30 day implementation lag of OPEC announcements. Details
on identification with two instruments and two shocks can be found in Appendix C.2.
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However, the first stage turns out to be considerably weaker and thus the results
should be interpreted with a grain of salt.
Invertibility. A necessary condition for identification is that the VAR spans all
relevant information. As a robustness check, I analyze how the information con-
tained in the VAR affects the results. In the context of news shocks, Ramey (2016)
argues that using high-frequency surprises as instruments can be problematic with-
out including them in the model. However, including the oil supply surprise series
as the first variable in a recursive VAR, as proposed by Ramey (2011) and Plagborg-
Møller and Wolf (2019), yields comparable results. Some responses are weaker and
less precisely estimated but none of the differences are statistically significant (see
Figure A.14). I also analyze how the baseline results are affected when including the
additional variables in Section 4.4. As shown in Figure A.15, the results are robust
to the inclusion of additional variables.
5.2. Specification and data choices
Model specification. An important issue in VAR models is the selection of ap-
propriate indicators. Two crucial choices concern the global activity and the oil price
indicator. In the baseline model, I use Baumeister and Hamilton’s (2019) world in-
dustrial production index, because it is easily interpretable and directly comparable
to its U.S. counterpart. An often used alternative is Kilian’s (2009) global activity
index. The results using this alternative activity indicator are very similar. As the
oil price indicator, I use the WTI spot price, deflated by the U.S. CPI, to ensure
maximum instrument strength. Another commonly used measure is the real refiner
acquisition cost of imported crude. Using this alternative measure produces con-
sistent results (see Figures A.18-A.19). In the Appendix A.4, I also analyze the
robustness with respect to other specification choices including the lag order, vari-
able transformations and deterministics. The responses turn out to be robust with
respect to all of these choices.
Sample and data frequency. It is conceivable that over the relatively long sam-
ple period structural relationships have evolved over time. To examine this, I esti-
mate the model for different subsamples. Figure A.27 presents the results based on
a shorter estimation sample starting in 1982M4, which marks the start of the instru-
ment and coincides with the beginning of the Great Moderation. The responses turn
out to be less persistent and some responses are weaker. Qualitatively, however, the
results are very similar. I also show that excluding the Great Recession or the shale
oil revolution does not change the results materially (see Figures A.28-A.29).
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The baseline VAR runs on monthly data. To analyze the effects on quarterly
variables of interest, such as real GDP, I have to aggregate the VAR to the quarterly
frequency. The baseline responses turn out to be very similar (see Figure A.31). As
expected, however, the instrument is weaker reflecting the lower signal-to-noise ratio.
6. Conclusion
An important driver of oil prices are expectations about future oil market conditions.
Identifying shocks to expectations, however, is a daunting task. This paper proposes
a novel identification strategy to shed light on the role of oil supply expectations.
Using variation in futures prices in a tight window around OPEC announcements,
I identify an oil supply news shock. Oil supply news shocks have significant effects
on the macroeconomy and contribute meaningfully to historical variations in eco-
nomic activity and prices, pointing to a strong channel operating through supply
expectations.
References
Al-Naimi, Ali. 2016. Out of the desert: My journey from nomadic bedouin to the heart
of global oil. Penguin, UK.
Alquist, Ron and Lutz Kilian. 2010. “What do we learn from the price of crude oil
futures?” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 25(4): 539–573.
Antolín-Díaz, Juan and Juan F. Rubio-Ramírez. 2018. “Narrative sign restrictions
for SVARs.” American Economic Review, 108(10): 2802–29.
Anzuini, Alessio, Patrizio Pagano, and Massimiliano Pisani. 2015. “Macroe-
conomic effects of precautionary demand for oil.” Journal of Applied Econometrics,
30(6): 968–986.
Arezki, Rabah and Olivier Blanchard. 2015. “The 2014 oil price slump: Seven key
questions.” VoxEU, January, 13.
Arezki, Rabah, Valerie A. Ramey, and Liugang Sheng. 2017. “News shocks in open
economies: Evidence from giant oil discoveries.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
132(1): 103–155.
Barsky, Robert B. and Eric R. Sims. 2011. “News shocks and business cycles.” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 58(3): 273–289.
Barsky, Robert B. and Lutz Kilian. 2004. “Oil and the macroeconomy since the
1970s.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(4): 115–134.
Bastianin, Andrea and Matteo Manera. 2018. “How does stock market volatility
react to oil price shocks?” Macroeconomic Dynamics, 22(3): 666–682.
Baumeister, Christiane and Gert Peersman. 2013. “Time-varying effects of oil sup-
36
ply shocks on the US economy.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 5(4): 1–
28.
Baumeister, Christiane and James D. Hamilton. 2019. “Structural interpretation
of vector autoregressions with incomplete identification: Revisiting the role of oil supply
and demand shocks.” American Economic Review, 109(5): 1873–1910.
Baumeister, Christiane and Lutz Kilian. 2017. “A general approach to recovering
market expectations from futures prices with an application to crude oil.”
Baumeister, Christiane, Lutz Kilian, and Xiaoqing Zhou. 2018. “Is the discre-
tionary income effect of oil price shocks a hoax?” The Energy Journal, 39(Special Issue
2).
Beaudry, Paul and Franck Portier. 2006. “Stock prices, news, and economic fluctua-
tions.” American Economic Review, 96(4): 1293–1307.
Beaudry, Paul and Franck Portier. 2014. “News-driven business cycles: insights and
challenges.” Journal of Economic Literature, 52(4): 993–1074.
Bloom, Nicholas. 2009. “The impact of uncertainty shocks.” Econometrica, 77(3): 623–
685.
Branger, Nicole, René Marian Flacke, and Nikolai Gräber. 2020. “Monopoly
power in the oil market and the macroeconomy.” Energy Economics, 85: 104597.
Caldara, Dario and Matteo Iacoviello. 2018. “Measuring geopolitical risk.”
Caldara, Dario, Michele Cavallo, and Matteo Iacoviello. 2019. “Oil price elastici-
ties and oil price fluctuations.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 103: 1–20.
Cavallo, Michele and Tao Wu. 2012. “Measuring oil-price shocks using market-based
information.” IMF Working Paper, 12/19.
CME Group. 2018. “Light sweet crude oil futures and options.” https:
// www. cmegroup. com/ trading/ why-futures/ welcome-to-nymex-wti-light-
sweet-crude-oil-futures. html , [Online; accessed 16-January-2019].
Coibion, Olivier and Yuriy Gorodnichenko. 2015. “Is the Phillips curve alive and
well after all? Inflation expectations and the missing disinflation.” American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(1): 197–232.
Coibion, Olivier, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Rupal Kamdar. 2018. “The forma-
tion of expectations, inflation, and the Phillips curve.” Journal of Economic Literature,
56(4): 1447–91.
Davis, Steven J. and John Haltiwanger. 2001. “Sectoral job creation and destruction
responses to oil price changes.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 48(3): 465–512.
Demirer, Rıza and Ali M. Kutan. 2010. “The behavior of crude oil spot and futures
prices around OPEC and SPR announcements: an event study perspective.” Energy
Economics, 32(6): 1467–1476.
Draper, Dennis W. 1984. “The behavior of event-related returns on oil futures con-
tracts.” Journal of Futures Markets, 4(2): 125–132.
Edelstein, Paul and Lutz Kilian. 2009. “How sensitive are consumer expenditures to
37
retail energy prices?” Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(6): 766–779.
Gambetti, Luca and Laura Moretti. 2017. “News, noise and oil price swings.” Central
Bank of Ireland.
Gao, Liping, Hyeongwoo Kim, and Richard Saba. 2014. “How do oil price shocks
affect consumer prices?” Energy Economics, 45: 313–323.
Gertler, Mark and Peter Karadi. 2015. “Monetary policy surprises, credit costs, and
economic activity.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(1): 44–76.
Gilchrist, Simon and Egon Zakrajšek. 2012. “Credit spreads and business cycle fluc-
tuations.” American Economic Review, 102(4): 1692–1720.
Gürkaynak, Refet S., Brian Sack, and Eric T. Swanson. 2005. “Do actions speak
louder than words? The response of asset prices to monetary policy actions and state-
ments.” International Journal of Central Banking, 1: 55–93.
Hamilton, James D. 1988. “A neoclassical model of unemployment and the business
cycle.” Journal of Political Economy, 96(3): 593–617.
Hamilton, James D. 2003. “What is an oil shock?” Journal of Econometrics,
113(2): 363–398.
Hamilton, James D. 2008. “Oil and the macroeconomy.” The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics, 2.
Hamilton, James D. 2009. “Causes and consequences of the oil shock of 2007-08.”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1(Spring): 215–261.
Hasenzagl, Thomas, Filippo Pellegrino, Lucrezia Reichlin, and Giovanni Ricco.
2018. “A model of the Fed’s view on inflation.”
Hoover, Kevin D. and Stephen J. Perez. 1994. “Post hoc ergo propter once more an
evaluation of ‘does monetary policy matter?’ in the spirit of James Tobin.” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 34(1): 47–74.
Jarociński, Marek and Peter Karadi. 2020. “Deconstructing monetary policy sur-
prises—the role of information shocks.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
12(2): 1–43.
Jentsch, Carsten and Kurt G. Lunsford. 2019. “The dynamic effects of personal and
corporate income tax changes in the United States: Comment.” American Economic
Review, 109(7): 2655–78.
Jordà, Òscar. 2005. “Estimation and inference of impulse responses by local projections.”
American Economic Review, 95(1): 161–182.
Juvenal, Luciana and Ivan Petrella. 2015. “Speculation in the oil market.” Journal
of Applied Econometrics, 30(4): 621–649.
Kilian, Lutz. 2008. “Exogenous oil supply shocks: how big are they and how much do
they matter for the US economy?” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2): 216–
240.
Kilian, Lutz. 2009. “Not all oil price shocks are alike: disentangling demand and supply
shocks in the crude oil market.” American Economic Review, 99(3): 1053–69.
38
Kilian, Lutz and Daniel P. Murphy. 2012. “Why agnostic sign restrictions are not
enough: understanding the dynamics of oil market VAR models.” Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association, 10(5): 1166–1188.
Kilian, Lutz and Daniel P. Murphy. 2014. “The role of inventories and speculative
trading in the global market for crude oil.” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 29(3): 454–
478.
Klitgaard, Thomas, Paolo Pesenti, and Linda Wang. 2019. “The perplexing
co-movement of the dollar and oil prices.” https: // libertystreeteconomics.
newyorkfed. org/ 2019/ 01/ the-perplexing-co-movement-of-the-dollar-and-
oil-prices. html , [Online; accessed 24-March-2019].
Kuttner, Kenneth N. 2001. “Monetary policy surprises and interest rates: Evidence
from the Fed funds futures market.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 47(3): 523–544.
Lawler, Alex, Amena Bakr, and Dmitry Zhdannikov. 2014. “Inside OPEC
room, Naimi declares price war on US shale oil.” Reuters Business News, https:
// uk. reuters. com/ article/ uk-opec-meeting-idUKKCN0JB0M420141128 , [Online;
accessed 17-Jan-2020].
Leeper, Eric M., Todd B. Walker, and Shu-Chun Susan Yang. 2013. “Fiscal
foresight and information flows.” Econometrica, 81(3): 1115–1145.
Lin, Sharon X. and Michael Tamvakis. 2010. “OPEC announcements and their effects
on crude oil prices.” Energy Policy, 38(2): 1010–1016.
Lippi, Francesco and Andrea Nobili. 2012. “Oil and the macroeconomy: a quantita-
tive structural analysis.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(5): 1059–
1083.
Lizardo, Radhamés A. and André V. Mollick. 2010. “Oil price fluctuations and US
dollar exchange rates.” Energy Economics, 32(2): 399–408.
Loderer, Claudio. 1985. “A test of the OPEC cartel hypothesis: 1974–1983.” The Jour-
nal of Finance, 40(3): 991–1006.
Loutia, Amine, Constantin Mellios, and Kostas Andriosopoulos. 2016. “Do
OPEC announcements influence oil prices?” Energy Policy, 90: 262–272.
Mertens, Karel and Morten O. Ravn. 2013. “The dynamic effects of personal
and corporate income tax changes in the United States.” American Economic Review,
103(4): 1212–47.
Miranda-Agrippino, Silvia and Giovanni Ricco. 2018a. “Identification with external
instruments in structural VARs under partial invertibility.”
Miranda-Agrippino, Silvia and Giovanni Ricco. 2018b. “The transmission of mon-
etary policy shocks.”
Montiel-Olea, José L., James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson. 2016. “Uniform
inference in SVARs identified with external instruments.”
Nakamura, Emi and Jón Steinsson. 2018a. “High-frequency identification of mon-
etary non-neutrality: The information effect.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
39
133(3): 1283–1330.
Nakamura, Emi and Jón Steinsson. 2018b. “Identification in macroeconomics.” Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, 32(3): 59–86.
OPEC Secretariat. 2003. “OPEC production agreements: a detailed listing.” OPEC
Review, 27(1): 65–77.
Pindyck, Robert S. 2001. “The dynamics of commodity spot and futures markets: a
primer.” The Energy Journal, 1–29.
Plagborg-Møller, Mikkel and Christian K. Wolf. 2019. “Local projections and VARs
estimate the same impulse responses.”
Ramey, Valerie A. 2011. “Identifying government spending shocks: It’s all in the tim-
ing.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1): 1–50.
Ramey, Valerie A. 2016. “Macroeconomic shocks and their propagation.” In Handbook
of Macroeconomics. Vol. 2, 71–162. Elsevier.
Rigobon, Roberto. 2003. “Identification through heteroskedasticity.” Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 85(4): 777–792.
Rigobon, Roberto and Brian Sack. 2004. “The impact of monetary policy on asset
prices.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(8): 1553–1575.
Roberts, Paul. 2005. The end of oil: The decline of the petroleum economy and the rise
of a new energy order. Bloomsbury Publishing, UK.
Romer, Christina D. and David H. Romer. 2004. “A new measure of monetary
shocks: Derivation and implications.” American Economic Review, 94(4): 1055–1084.
Stock, James H. and Mark W. Watson. 2012. “Disentangling the channels of the
2007-2009 recession.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
Stock, James H. and Mark W. Watson. 2018. “Identification and estimation of
dynamic causal effects in macroeconomics using external instruments.” The Economic
Journal, 128(610): 917–948.
Wong, Benjamin. 2015. “Do inflation expectations propagate the inflationary impact of
real oil price shocks?: Evidence from the Michigan survey.” Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, 47(8): 1673–1689.
Yergin, Daniel. 2011. The prize: The epic quest for oil, money & power. Simon and
Schuster.










A. Charts, tables and additional sensitivity checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A.1. Diagnostics of the surprise series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A.2. Effects on the oil market and the macroeconomy . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A.2.1. Accounting for background noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A.2.2. Local projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.2.3. Model uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.3. Wider effects and propagation channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.4. Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.4.1. Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.4.2. Specification and data choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
B.1. OPEC announcements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
B.2. Data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
C. Identification using external instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
C.1. Simple case with one shock and one instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
C.2. General case for k shocks and k instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
D. Identification via heteroskedasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
References Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
∗Contact: Diego R. Känzig, London Business School, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA, United
Kingdom. E-mail: dkaenzig@london.edu. Web: diegokaenzig.com.
1
A. Charts, tables and additional sensitivity checks
In this Appendix, I present additional tables and figures, and sensitivity checks that
are not featured in the main body of the paper. The subappendices refer to the
corresponding sections in the main text.
A.1. Diagnostics of the surprise series
As discussed in the paper, I perform a number of additional validity checks on
the surprise series. In the main text, I already discussed the role of background
noise in detail. A related concern is that there may be other news confounding
the surprise series in a systematic way. Even though this seems unlikely given
the rather irregular schedule of OPEC conferences, I checked whether any of the
major U.S. news releases systematically occur on OPEC dates. Table A.1 confirms
that no release systematically overlaps with OPEC announcements. For all these
releases, there are only a few, random overlaps. Excluding the overlapping dates in
constructing the instrument does also not change the results materially.1
Table A.1: U.S. macroeconomic news announcements
Announcement Observations Source Dates Frequency Overlaps
GDP 114 BEA 4/1987-12/2017 quarterly 2
Unemployment rate 466 BLS 1/1983-12/2017 monthly 5
Nonfarm payrolls 405 BLS 2/1985-12/2017 monthly 5
Retail sales 385 BC 12/1986-12/2017 monthly 3
Industrial production 385 FRB 12/1986-12/2017 monthly 6
Durable goods orders 464 BC 4/1983-12/2017 monthly 10
Trade balance 384 BEA 12/1986-12/2017 monthly 8
CPI 467 BLS 1/1983-12/2017 monthly 3
PPI 385 BLS 12/1986-12/2017 monthly 5
FOMC 305 FED 3/1983-12/2017 six-week 4
Notes: The table shows information on major U.S. macroeconomic news announcements
on activity, prices and monetary policy together with the number of instances in which
they coincide with OPEC announcement days. The U.S. news data are from Kilian and
Vega (2011), extended for the most recent period using Bloomberg.
I also investigate the autocorrelation and forecastability of the surprise series
as well as the relation to other shocks from the literature. Figure A.1 depicts the
autocorrelation function. We can see that there is no evidence that the series is
serially correlated. I also perform a number of Granger causality tests. Table A.2
shows that the series is not forecastable by past macroeconomic or financial vari-
1This is in line with the findings by Kilian and Vega (2011), who found that energy prices do
not to respond instantaneously to U.S. macroeconomic news.
2
ables. Finally, I look how the series correlates with other shock series from the
literature and find that it is not correlated with other shocks such as global demand
or uncertainty shocks (see Table A.3). Not surprisingly, I find that the series is
significantly correlated with oil-specific demand shocks. This is consistent with the
fact that oil-specific demand shocks capture among other things news about future
supply. Finally, I find that the series is only weakly correlated with the previously
identified unanticipated oil supply shocks.
Figure A.1: The autocorrelation function of the oil supply surprise series




World oil production 0.7481
World oil inventories 0.6882
World industrial production 0.9502
US industrial production 0.9342
US CPI 0.7641





Notes: The table shows the p-values of a series of Granger causality tests of the oil supply
surprise series using a selection of macroeconomic and financial variables. To be able to
conduct standard inference, the series are made stationary by taking first differences where
necessary. The lag order is set to 12 and in terms of deterministics, only a constant term
is included.
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Table A.3: Correlation with other shock measures
Shock Source ρ p-value n Sample
Panel A: Oil shocks
Oil price Hamilton (2003) 0.06 0.17 492 1977M01-2017M12
Oil supply Kilian (2008) -0.05 0.38 369 1974M01-2004M09
Caldara, Cavallo, and Iacoviello (2019) -0.02 0.74 372 1985M01-2015M12
Baumeister and Hamilton (2019) -0.08 0.09 515 1975M02-2017M12
Kilian (2009) 0.08 0.09 395 1975M02-2007M12
Global demand Kilian (2009) 0.03 0.51 395 1975M02-2007M12
Oil-specific demand Kilian (2009) 0.17 0.00 395 1975M02-2007M12
Panel B: Other shocks
Productivity Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) -0.04 0.66 152 1974Q1-2011Q4
Smets and Wouters (2007) -0.06 0.50 124 1974Q1-2004Q4
News Barsky and Sims (2011) -0.14 0.12 135 1974Q1-2007Q3
Kurmann and Otrok (2013) -0.03 0.76 126 1974Q1-2005Q2
Beaudry and Portier (2014) 0.04 0.61 155 1974Q1-2012Q3
Monetary policy Gertler and Karadi (2015) 0.07 0.20 324 1990M01-2016M12
Romer and Romer (2004) -0.00 0.99 276 1974M01-1996M12
Smets and Wouters (2007) 0.04 0.64 124 1974Q1-2004Q4
Uncertainty Bloom (2009) 0.01 0.87 522 1974M07-2017M12
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) 0.07 0.15 390 1985M07-2017M12
Financial Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) 0.02 0.70 498 1974M07-2015M12
Bassett et al. (2014) 0.12 0.30 76 1992Q1-2010Q4
Fiscal policy Romer and Romer (2010) 0.03 0.77 136 1974Q1-2007Q4
Ramey (2011) 0.07 0.39 148 1974Q1-2010Q4
Fisher and Peters (2010) 0.05 0.55 140 1974Q1-2008Q4
Notes: The table shows the correlation of the oil supply surprise series with a wide range
of different shock measures from the literature. Panel A depicts the relationship with
other oil shocks. Panel B shows the relationship to other types of shocks. For these
shock measures, I draw on the shocks studied in Stock and Watson (2012) and Piffer and
Podstawski (2017). ρ is the Pearson correlation coefficient, the p-value corresponds to the
test whether the correlation is different from zero and n is the sample size. When the
shock measure is only available at the quarterly frequency, the oil supply surprise series is
aggregated by summing across months.
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A.2. Effects on the oil market and the macroeconomy
A.2.1. Accounting for background noise
As discussed in the main text, background noise in the oil supply series may lead to
unreliable inference and overstate the statistical precision of the estimates. There-
fore, it is important to analyze the robustness of the results when accounting for
background noise using the heteroskedasticity-based identification strategy.
As shown in the paper, accounting for background noise does not materially
change the point estimates but leads to larger sampling uncertainty. This may be
a bit surprising, given the non-trivial background noise documented in Figure 2 in
the paper. Here, I provide some suggestive evidence for the potential explanations
discussed in the main text.
One explanation is that the background noise may in fact largely reflect varia-
tion in market beliefs about future oil supply announcements. Studying the impulse
responses using the control series as an external instrument provides some sug-
gestive evidence for this explanation. As shown in the top panel of Figure A.2,
the responses to the control series display quite some similarity to the baseline re-
sponses, even though the responses for inventories and industrial production turn
out to be somewhat different. Interestingly, these are also the variables for which
we observe the relatively largest differences between the external instruments and
the heteroskedasticity-based approach in Figure 4 in the paper. These results are
in line with the interpretation that a large part of the background noise is in fact
oil supply news related and also accord well with the finding that oil supply news
shocks account for the bulk of the fluctuations in oil prices, especially in the short
run.
I also explored the explanation that most of the identification could come from
large shocks. To this end, I dropped very large surprises (i.e. surprises larger than
7 percent in absolute value) from the treatment sample. From the bottom panel of
Figure A.2, we can see that point estimates of the heteroskedasticity-based and the
external instruments estimator differ slightly more in this case. However, the most
striking difference arises for the confidence bands, which are now substantially wider
for the heteroskedasticity-based estimator, consistent with the lower variance ratio.
Thus, the large shocks appear to be quite important for the statistical precision of
the estimates.
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Panel A: Responses to control series
Panel B: Censoring large oil supply surprises
Figure A.2: Understanding heteroskedasticity-based identification
Notes: Investigating potential explanations for the similarity of the heteroskedasticity-
based and the external instruments estimator. Panel A: Responses using the control series
as an external instrument. Panel B: Responses from the two estimation approaches after
censoring large values in the surprise series to zero. The shock is normalized to increase
the real price of oil by 10 percent on impact. The solid lines are the point estimates and
the shaded areas are 68 and 90 percent confidence bands, respectively.
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To analyze the role of the dynamic VAR structure, I compute again the impulse
responses to the identified shock from the heteroskedasticity-based VAR using local
projections. The results are shown in Figure A.3. We can see that the VAR-
based and the LP-based impulse responses are very similar but the LP responses
are more erratic and less precisely estimated, in line with the findings for the external
instruments approach.
Figure A.3: Local projections on oil supply news shock (heteroskedasticity-based)
Notes: Impulse responses estimated from LPs on the oil supply news shock extracted from
the heteroskedasticity-based VAR (black) together with VAR responses (red), normalized
to increase the real price of oil by 10 percent on impact. The solid lines are the point




An alternative approach would be to directly estimate the dynamic causal effects us-
ing local projections on the surprise series. However, directly estimating the macroe-
conomic effects of high-frequency surprises is challenging. As discussed in Nakamura
and Steinsson (2018), the clean identification via the high-frequency approach often
comes at the cost of lower statistical power. Intuitively, macroeconomic variables
several months, quarters or even years out are hit by a myriad of shocks. At the
same time, the oil price is an extremely volatile variable itself and the high-frequency
surprises account only for a small part of the price fluctuations, rendering the signal-
to-noise ratio low. This makes it challenging to directly estimate the macroeconomic
effects of high-frequency oil supply surprises without imposing additional structure.
Furthermore, the high-frequency surprises are typically only available for a shorter
sample than the outcome variables of interest, further reducing statistical power.
The VAR approach allows one to estimate the reduced form over a longer sam-
ple even if the instrument is only available for a subperiod, improving efficiency at
all horizons. By contrast, in the local projection framework there is less scope to
improve efficiency (Stock and Watson, 2018).
Local projections-IV. Despite these challenges, I present here the results from a
local projections-instrumental variable (LP-IV) approach. To fix ideas, the responses







hxt−1 + ξi,t,h, (1)
using the oil supply surprise series zt as an instrument for the oil price, pt, where yi,t
is the outcome variable of interest and xt−1 is a vector of controls. ψ
i
h is the impulse
response to the oil supply news shock of variable i at horizon h.2
An important choice in this context concerns the selection of control variables.
According to Stock and Watson (2018), there are three reasons for adding control
variables. First, and most importantly, the instrument may satisfy the exogeneity
condition only after controlling for some observable factors. Second, control variables
can help to increase the instrument strength in the first stage by filtering out the
effects of past shocks and thus increasing the signal-to noise ratio. Third, and
2To increase efficiency, I follow Stock and Watson (2018) and estimate the controls on the
full sample and then use the residuals in the local projections for the subsample for which the
instrument is available. An alternative would be just to censor the missing values in the instrument
to zero and run the local projections including the controls on the full sample (see also Noh, 2019).
In practice, I found that these two approaches produce similar results. To compute the bands, I
use HAC standard errors with a lag length of 1 plus the horizon in question.
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Panel A: Baseline specification
Panel B: Robustness with respect to controls
Figure A.4: Local projection-instrumental variable approach
Notes: Impulse responses to the oil supply news shock from LP-IVs. Panel A: Impulse
responses from the baseline LP-IV (black) together with the responses from the external
instruments VAR (red). The solid lines are the point estimates and the shaded areas
and dashed/dotted lines are 68 and 90 percent confidence bands, respectively. Panel B:
Robustness of LP-IV responses with respect to the selection of controls. I consider 12, 18,
and 24 lags of all variables as well as the same number of lags in specifications with oil
market and U.S. variable specific-controls.
9
relatedly, including control variables helps to reduce the sampling variance of the
IV estimator by reducing the variance of the error term.
Because the oil market is known to feature persistent cycles (see e.g. Herrera
and Hamilton, 2004), it is important to control for sufficient lags. However, when
choosing the controls, there is always a trade-off between underfitting and overfitting.
In light of this, I use a specification with 18 lags and oil market and U.S. variable
specific controls as the baseline. For the oil market variables, I only use lags of the oil
price, oil production, oil inventories and world industrial production. For the U.S.
variables I also control for lags of industrial production and the CPI, respectively.
This flexible specification allows to control for sufficient lags of the relevant variables
while keeping the model degrees of freedom manageable.
The results are shown in the top panel of Figure A.4. The point estimates turn
out to be reasonably similar to the VAR responses: the oil price rises significantly,
world oil production tends to fall with a lag, oil inventories increase persistently,
world and U.S. industrial production fall and the U.S. CPI increases significantly.
However, compared to the VAR, all responses are much more erratic and the stan-
dard errors are substantially larger, especially at longer horizons. This had to ex-
pected to a certain extent as we impose less structure.
The bottom panel of Figure A.4 analyzes how the results depend on the controls
used in the LP-IVs. In particular, I consider 12, 18, and 24 lags of all variables as
well as the same number of lags in specifications with oil market and U.S. variable
specific-controls. The main takeaway is that the results are not driven by one specific
set of controls. Especially at shorter horizons, the responses are all very similar.
At longer horizons there is more uncertainty, as is common in time series models.
It should be noted, however, that given the relatively large standard errors, the
differences across LP specifications are not statistically significant.
Heteroskedasticity-based local projections. We can also implement the
heteroskedasticity-based identification strategy in the local projections framework.
Define again a sample of treatment (R1) and control periods (R2) and compute the
instrument zt in both periods. As shown in Nakamura and Steinsson (2018), the
heteroskedasticity-based estimator is then given by
ψih =
covR1(yi,t+h, zt) − covR2(yi,t+h, zt)
varR1(zt) − varR2(zt)
.
As in the LP-IVs, I first estimate the coefficients of the control variables on the
full sample and then use the residuals y⊥i,t+h in the heteroskedasticity-based estimator
for the subsample for which zt is available. As controls, I use the same set of variables
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as the baseline LP-IV specification. To compute the impulse responses, I use again
the implementation through instrumental variables developed in Rigobon and Sack
(2004).3
Figure A.5: Heteroskedasticity-based local projections
Notes: Impulse responses to the oil supply news shock from heteroskedasticity-based local
projections (black) together with the LP-IV responses (red), normalized to increase the
real price of oil by 10 percent on impact. The solid lines are the point estimates and the
shaded areas and dashed/dotted lines are 68 and 90 percent confidence bands, respectively.
The results are shown in Figure A.5. We can see that most responses are qualita-
tively similar to the baseline LP-IVs. However, some of the responses, in particular
the world and U.S. industrial production responses, turn out to be a bit weaker.
The responses are also less precisely estimated and somewhat more erratic. This
probably had to be expected to a certain extent, as the problems regarding statisti-
cal power discussed above are likely more acute in this context because the sample
has to be further split into a treatment and control sample.
These results illustrate again the challenges of directly estimating the economic
effects of high-frequency surprises. An elegant solution to this problem is to focus
on variables that move contemporaneously, such as financial variables and survey
expectations, as proposed by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018). However, if we are
interested in macroeconomic variables, estimating the dynamic causal effects turns
3Given that the first-stage F-statistic confirmed that the change in variance is significant enough,
I use standard HAC errors to compute the bands, as in the LP-IV regressions.
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out to be challenging without imposing additional structure, as illustrated above.
A.2.3. Model uncertainty
To study in more detail how the modeling choice affects the results, I perform a
systematic evaluation of the role of model uncertainty. In particular, I consider the
following models:
1. External instruments VAR
2. LP using shock from external instruments VAR
3. LP-IV using oil supply surprise series
4. Heteroskedasticity-based VAR
5. LP using shock from heteroskedasticity-based VAR
6. Heteroskedasticity-based LP
7. Heteroskedasticity-based VAR (implementation as in Wright 2012)
For each model, I further consider a specification with 12, 18, and 24 lags as controls.4
The results are presented in Figure A.6. Depicted is the minimum and the
maximum of the point estimates of all the models and specifications considered,
together with the baseline responses from the external instruments VAR. We can see
that qualitatively, the conclusions of the paper turn out to be robust with respect to
the modeling choice. For the large majority of models, an oil supply news shock leads
to an immediate increase in the oil price, a gradual decrease in world oil production,
an increase in world oil inventories, a fall in world and U.S. industrial production,
and an increase in U.S. CPI.5 Quantitatively, however, the effects can differ quite a
bit across the different models: some models are associated with somewhat weaker
effects while other models feature effects that are more pronounced. Importantly,
the baseline responses appear to lie mostly somewhere in between.
4For the LP specifications, I use both general and variable-specific controls as discussed above.
5The only qualitative difference emerges for world and U.S. industrial production, which ac-
cording to a few specifications that impose very little structure merely changes or even tends to
increase slightly. However, in light of the power problems discussed above and the large uncer-
tainty around these estimates, these results should be interpreted with a grain of salt.
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Figure A.6: The role of model uncertainty
Notes: The figure displays the model uncertainty for the results of oil supply news on the
macroeconomy, as measured by the minimum and the maximum of the point estimates
for a wide selection of different models and model specifications, including different spec-
ifications of the external instruments and heteroskedasticity-based VAR and LP models,
together with the baseline responses (black line).
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A.3. Wider effects and propagation channels
Below, I show the impulse responses of additional variables of interest, as discussed
in the main text.
Figure A.7: Personal consumption expenditures
Figure A.8: Stock indices for different industries
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To address the potential concern that monetary policy may contaminate the
baseline results, I also study how the results are affected when controlling for the
policy rate. Figure A.9 presents the responses from the model augmented by the
federal funds rate together with the baseline responses. We can see that controlling
for the federal funds rate does not affect the results materially.
Figure A.9: Model with federal funds rate
Notes: Impulse responses from the model augmented with the federal funds rate. The
shaded areas are 68 and 90 percent confidence bands, respectively. The red dotted lines




Announcements. The news coverage of OPEC meetings in the financial press is
suggestive that there is no strong information channel confounding high-frequency
oil supply surprises, as the focus is typically on whether OPEC could agree on
production quotas or not. This is illustrated in Table A.4, which shows the headlines
and main paragraphs of a selection of articles by the Financial Times on OPEC
meetings.
Table A.4: News coverage on OPEC meetings by the Financial Times
Date Headline Main paragraph
Dec 4, 2019 OPEC and Russia agree
deeper production cuts to
prop up oil prices
The so-called OPEC+ alliance, which
also includes Russia, agreed curbs of
500,000 barrels per day on Friday after
two days of fraught meetings in Vienna,
with Saudi Arabia pledging additional
voluntary cuts of a further 400,000 b/d.
Dec 4, 2015 OPEC meeting ends in ac-
rimony
OPEC will stick with its policy of not
constraining output and has all but
abandoned its official production target
at its semi-annual meeting, risking a fur-
ther drop in oil prices that are currently
close to six-year lows.
Mar 17, 2010 OPEC keeps oil quota un-
changed
The OPEC oil cartel on Wednesday
kept its production quotas unchanged, as
ministers flipped from worrying about oil
prices falling too far to becoming wary of
them rising too high.
Mar 16, 2005 OPEC agrees to raise oil
production quotas
OPEC producers agreed a 2 per cent in-
crease in oil supplies on Wednesday, rais-
ing production limits by 500,000 barrels
a day to 27.5m b/d, the highest level
since the quota system was introduced
in 1987.
To address this concern more formally, I construct an informationally robust oil
supply surprise series. Since 2001, OPEC publishes monthly oil market reports,
including information about world oil demand, supply as well as stock movements.
Importantly the report also includes OPEC’s global demand forecasts and forecast
revisions. Figure A.10 shows an excerpt of the oil market report from December
2006.
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Figure A.10: OPEC’s world oil demand forecast for 2007
Source: OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report, December 2006.
I collected all world oil demand forecasts as well as forecast revisions from the
reports for 2001-2017. This data is then used to construct a refined version of
the oil supply surprise series, purged from potential confounding factors coming
from global demand. A delicate issue here is the timing, i.e. when the reports are
released for publication. For a large part of the OPEC announcements, these reports
were published shortly after the OPEC meetings. For some meetings, in particular
extraordinary ones taking place towards the end of a given month, the report is
already available before the announcement. In these cases, the refinement should
have no effect as this information is already known to markets. In this sense, the
refinement does not control for all potential confounding demand factors but for a
large part. In addition, I also analyze whether only using ordinary announcements
in the construction of the instrument changes the results.
The results are displayed in Figures A.11-A.12. We can see that the responses
based on the refined, informationally robust instrument are consistent with the re-
sponses using the raw instrument. Apart from a few minor, statistically insignificant
differences, the responses are very similar. Note that the results based on the raw
instrument are slightly different from the baseline in Section 4 of the paper because
of the shorter identification sample. Likewise, using only ordinary announcements
to construct the instrument yields very similar results to the baseline case.
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Figure A.11: Raw versus refined instrument
Notes: Impulse responses using the refined (black) and the raw oil supply surprise series
(red). The solid lines are the point estimates and the shaded areas and dashed/dotted
lines are 68 and 90 percent confidence bands, respectively.
Figure A.12: Using ordinary announcements only
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News and surprise shocks. Figure A.13 presents the IRFs from the two-shock
proxy VAR introduced in the main text. The results suggest that we can identify
the oil supply news shock without controlling for the oil supply surprise shock.
Figure A.13: Two-shock proxy VAR
Notes: The top panel is the oil supply surprise shock and the bottom panel is the oil
supply news shock. The shocks are identified using Kilian’s (2008) production shortfall
series, extended by Bastianin and Manera (2018), and the oil supply surprise series as
instruments. The surprise shock is normalized to decrease oil production by 1 percent and
the news shock to increase the oil price by 10 percent on impact.
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Invertibility. To be able to identify the shock of interest, the VAR has to span
all relevant information. As a robustness check, I analyze how the information
contained in the VAR affects the results. In the context of news shocks, Ramey
(2016) argues that using high-frequency surprises as instruments can be problem-
atic without including them in the VAR. Thus, as an alternative to the external
instruments approach, I include the oil supply surprise series as the first variable in
a recursive VAR. This is the so-called internal instruments approach (Ramey, 2011;
Plagborg-Møller and Wolf, 2019).6 The results are shown in Figure A.14. Overall,
the responses are less precisely estimated. Furthermore, the responses of the indus-
trial production indicators turn out to be less pronounced. However, none of these
differences are statistically significant.
Figure A.14: Internal versus external instruments approach
I also analyze how the inclusion of additional variables in Section 4.4 in the paper
affects the baseline results. Figure A.15 shows the impulse responses of the base-
line variables from all the augmented VAR models. The responses of the baseline
variables appear to be robust to the inclusion of additional variables. In particu-
lar, the impact responses turn out to be quite stable, supporting the validity of the
baseline proxy VAR. As Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2018) show, unstable im-
6A disadvantage of this approach is that we cannot easily accommodate instruments that are
only available for a shorter sample than the variables in the VAR, which is relevant for the appli-
cation at hand. Following Noh (2019), I censor the missing values to zero.
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pact responses are an indication that the instrument is contaminated by other past
structural shocks that are not filtered out by the VAR model. I also augmented the
VAR by factors estimated from the FRED-MD database. The results turn out to
be robust, indicating that there is no problem of informational insufficiency. These
results are available upon request.
Figure A.15: Responses from the extended models in Section 4.4
Additional robustness checks:
Constructing the instrument. To construct a time series of oil supply surprises,
I look at how oil futures prices change around OPEC announcements. In particular,
I use a composite measure, spanning the first year of the term structure. However,
in principle, we can use any asset price that is sufficiently responsive, such as single
futures contracts or the spot price. Figure A.16 presents responses based on instru-
ments constructed using the 1-month, 3-month, 9-month, and 12-month futures and
an extended composite measure (COMP+), which also includes the spot price and
the front contract, together with the response using the baseline composite measure.
The results do not change materially, illustrating that the crucial feature of my iden-
tification strategy is OPEC’s institutional framework and not the specific asset used
to measure the impact of OPEC announcements. The fact that the responses do not
differ much using different maturities also suggests that the results are not severely
affected by changes in risk premia.
21
Figure A.16: Instruments based on different futures contracts
Figure A.17: Using Brent as oil price indicator and to construct instrument
A related issue is the choice of the relevant oil price measure. As a benchmark, I
rely on WTI. However, in the most recent part of the sample, WTI has become less
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representative for the global price of oil because of the shale oil boom (Baumeister
and Kilian, 2016). For this period, Brent is probably the better measure. However,
Brent futures only started trading in the late 1980s and were less liquid at the
beginning, making the instrument sample even shorter. Figure A.17 presents the
IRFs using a composite instrument spanning the first year of the Brent futures term
structure and using the Brent spot price as the oil price indicator in the VAR. The
results turn out to be robust.
A.4.2. Specification and data choices
Model specification. Figures A.18-A.19 show the responses using Kilian’s (2009)
index as the global economic activity indicator and the responses using the real
refiner acquisition cost as the oil price indicator. The results are robust to using
these alternative indicators.
Figure A.18: Model with Kilian’s (2009) global activity indicator
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Figure A.19: Model with real refiner acquisition cost as oil price indicator
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I also perform a number of robustness checks with respect to the lag order,
the deterministics included in the model as well as the treatment of non-stationary
variables. In particular, I vary the lag order according to information criteria and
other popular choices in the literature, estimate a VAR without a constant as well
as VAR with a constant and a linear trend. Furthermore, I estimate a stationary
VAR in the real price of oil, world oil production growth, the change in world oil
inventories, world industrial production growth, U.S. industrial production growth
and U.S. CPI inflation. From Figures A.20-A.24, we can see that the results are
robust with respect to all these choices. Finally, in Figures A.25-A.26, I rely on
the exact same specification as in Kilian and Murphy (2014) and Baumeister and
Hamilton (2019), respectively. Again, the results turn out to be robust.
Figure A.20: Results from a VAR(7), selected by AIC
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Figure A.21: Results from VAR(24)
Figure A.22: VAR with linear trend
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Figure A.23: VAR without a constant
Figure A.24: Stationary VAR
Notes: (Cumulative) responses from stationary VAR in real oil price, world oil production
growth, change in world oil inventories, world IP growth, U.S. IP growth, and U.S. CPI
inflation.
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Figure A.25: Kilian and Murphy’s (2014) model specification
Figure A.26: Baumeister and Hamilton’s (2019) model specification
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Sample and data frequency. Figures A.27-A.29 present the results from the
subsample analyses. It turns out that the results do not seem to be driven by a
specific sample choice.
Figure A.27: Shorter estimation sample: 1982M4-2017M12.
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Figure A.28: Pre Great Recession: 1974M1-2007M12.
Figure A.29: Pre shale oil revolution: 1974M1-2010M12.
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I also check the sensitivity with respect to the instrument sample. In particular,
I test whether the results are robust if I exclude the first years of the instrument
when the futures markets were not as liquid. Figure A.30 depicts the IRFs using an
instrument that starts in 1990. Again, the results are robust.
Figure A.30: Shorter instrument sample: 1990M1-2017M12.
Finally, I check the robustness with respect to the data frequency. Figure A.31
presents the results based on the quarterly VAR. To aggregate the instrument to
the quarterly frequency, I sum it over the respective months. The results are very
similar to the monthly evidence.
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Figure A.31: Quarterly VAR
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B. Data
This Appendix gives more details on the historical OPEC announcements used to
construct the instruments as well as an overview of the data sources.
B.1. OPEC announcements
Table B.1 lists all OPEC announcements over the period 1983-2017. Starting from
2002, the press releases are available in the archive on the official OPEC webpage.7
Before that, I used OPEC resolutions (OPEC, 1990) and Bloomberg news to collect
the announcement dates. Note that some conferences ended on a weekend or a
holiday. Similarly, some conferences ended after the market close of the NYMEX.
For these conferences, the date of the next trading day is used to compute the
surprise. The table also includes the trading days in the control sample used for the
heteroskedasticity-based identification.
Table B.1: OPEC announcement dates over the period 1983–2017
















1984M07 11/07/1984 70th meeting of the OPEC conference
1984M08 29/08/1984
1984M09 26/09/1984
1984M10 31/10/1984 71st (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
1984M11 28/11/1984
1984M12 29/12/1984 72nd meeting of the OPEC conference












1985M10 04/10/1985 75th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
1985M11 11/11/1985









Month Announcement date Control date Additional information
1986M07 08/07/1986
1986M08 05/08/1986 78th meeting of the OPEC conference
1986M09 24/09/1986
1986M10 22/10/1986 79th meeting of the OPEC conference
1986M11 24/11/1986






























1989M06 07/06/1989 85th meeting of the OPEC conference
1989M07 26/07/1989
1989M08 30/08/1989
1989M09 27/09/1989 3rd meeting of the 8 ministerial monitoring committee
1989M10 31/10/1989













1990M12 13/12/1990 88th meeting of the OPEC conference
1991M01 15/01/1991
1991M02 12/02/1991
1991M03 12/03/1991 3rd meeting
1991M04 02/04/1991
1991M05 07/05/1991
1991M06 04/06/1991 89th meeting of the OPEC conference
1991M07 24/07/1991
1991M08 28/08/1991
1991M09 25/09/1991 4th meeting of the ministerial monitoring committee
1991M10 23/10/1991
1991M11 27/11/1991 90th meeting of the OPEC conference
1991M12 17/12/1991
1992M01 21/01/1992
1992M02 15/02/1992 6th meeting of the ministerial monitoring committee
1992M03 24/03/1992
1992M04 28/04/1992




1992M09 17/09/1992 9th meeting of the ministerial monitoring committee
1992M10 26/10/1992
1992M11 27/11/1992 92nd meeting of the OPEC conference
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Month Announcement date Control date Additional information
1992M12 16/12/1992
1993M01 20/01/1993




1993M06 10/06/1993 93rd meeting of the OPEC conference
1993M07 29/07/1993
1993M08 26/08/1993
1993M09 29/09/1993 94th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
1993M10 25/10/1993




1994M03 26/03/1994 12th meeting of the ministerial monitoring committee
1994M04 14/04/1994
1994M05 19/05/1994










































1997M12 01/12/1997 103rd meeting of the OPEC conference
1998M01 26/01/1998
1998M02 23/02/1998
1998M03 30/03/1998 104th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
1998M04 22/04/1998
1998M05 27/05/1998









1999M03 23/03/1999 107th meeting of the OPEC conference
1999M04 21/04/1999
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2000M03 29/03/2000 109th meeting of the OPEC conference
2000M04 19/04/2000
2000M05 24/05/2000
2000M06 21/06/2000 110th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2000M07 10/07/2000
2000M08 14/08/2000
2000M09 11/09/2000 111th meeting of the OPEC conference
2000M10 16/10/2000
2000M11 13/11/2000 112th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2000M12 13/12/2000
2001M01 17/01/2001 113th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2001M02 20/02/2001
2001M03 17/03/2001 114th meeting of the OPEC conference
2001M04 03/04/2001
2001M05 08/05/2001
2001M06 05/06/2001 115th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2001M07 03/07/2001,
25/07/2001
116th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2001M08 30/08/2001
2001M09 27/09/2001 117th meeting of the OPEC conference
2001M10 17/10/2001
2001M11 14/11/2001 118th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2001M12 28/12/2001 Consultative meeting of the OPEC conference
2002M01 11/01/2002
2002M02 15/02/2002
2002M03 15/03/2002 119th meeting of the OPEC conference
2002M04 24/04/2002
2002M05 29/05/2002
2002M06 26/06/2002 120th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2002M07 18/07/2002
2002M08 22/08/2002
2002M09 19/09/2002 121st meeting of the OPEC conference
2002M10 10/10/2002
2002M11 14/11/2002
2002M12 12/12/2002 122nd (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2003M01 12/01/2003 123rd (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2003M02 11/02/2003
2003M03 11/03/2003 124th meeting of the OPEC conference
2003M04 24/04/2003 Consultative meeting of the OPEC conference
2003M05 14/05/2003
2003M06 11/06/2003 125th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2003M07 31/07/2003 126th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2003M08 27/08/2003
2003M09 24/09/2003 127th meeting of the OPEC conference
2003M10 02/10/2003
2003M11 06/11/2003
2003M12 04/12/2003 128th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2004M01 13/01/2004
2004M02 10/02/2004 129th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2004M03 31/03/2004 130th meeting of the OPEC conference
2004M04 01/04/2004
2004M05 06/05/2004
2004M06 03/06/2004 131st (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2004M07 14/07/2004
2004M08 18/08/2004
2004M09 15/09/2004 132nd meeting of the OPEC conference
2004M10 08/10/2004
2004M11 12/11/2004
2004M12 10/12/2004 133rd (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2005M01 30/01/2005 134th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2005M02 16/02/2005
2005M03 16/03/2005 135th meeting of the OPEC conference
2005M04 13/04/2005
2005M05 18/05/2005




Month Announcement date Control date Additional information
2005M09 20/09/2005 137th meeting of the OPEC conference
2005M10 10/10/2005
2005M11 14/11/2005
2005M12 12/12/2005 138th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2006M01 31/01/2006 139th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2006M02 08/02/2006
2006M03 08/03/2006 140th meeting of the OPEC conference
2006M04 06/04/2006
2006M05 04/05/2006
2006M06 01/06/2006 141st (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2006M07 10/07/2006
2006M08 14/08/2006
2006M09 11/09/2006 142nd meeting of the OPEC conference
2006M10 20/10/2006 Consultative meeting of the OPEC conference
2006M11 09/11/2006
2006M12 14/12/2006 143rd (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2007M01 18/01/2007
2007M02 15/02/2007






2007M09 11/09/2007 145th meeting of the OPEC conference
2007M10 03/10/2007
2007M11 07/11/2007
2007M12 05/12/2007 146th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2008M01 04/01/2008
2008M02 01/02/2008 147th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference






2008M09 10/09/2008 149th meeting of the OPEC conference
2008M10 24/10/2008 150th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2008M11 19/11/2008
2008M12 17/12/2008 151st (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2009M01 12/01/2009
2009M02 09/02/2009
2009M03 15/03/2009 152nd meeting of the OPEC conference
2009M04 30/04/2009




2009M09 10/09/2009 154th meeting of the OPEC conference
2009M10 20/10/2009
2009M11 24/11/2009
2009M12 22/12/2009 155th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2010M01 13/01/2010
2010M02 17/02/2010







2010M10 14/10/2010 157th meeting of the OPEC conference
2010M11 15/11/2010












2011M12 14/12/2011 160th meeting of the OPEC conference
2012M01 12/01/2012
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2016M06 02/06/2016 169th meeting of the OPEC conference
2016M07 28/07/2016
2016M08 25/08/2016
2016M09 28/09/2016 170th (extraordinary) meeting of the OPEC conference
2016M10 26/10/2016
2016M11 30/11/2016 171st meeting of the OPEC conference















Table B.2 gives details on the data used in the paper, including information on the
coverage and data sources.
Table B.2: Data description, sources, and coverage
Variable Description Source Sample Trans.
Instrument






OILPRICE WTI spot crude oil price (WTISPLC) deflated by
U.S. CPI (CPIAUCSL)
FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
EIA1955 World oil production Datastream 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
OECD+6IP Industrial production of OECD + 6 (Brazil, China,
India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa) from




OECDSTOCKS OECD crude oil inventories, calculated based on
OECD petroleum stocks (EIA1976) and U.S. crude
oil and petroleum stocks (EIA1533, EIA1541), as in




INDPRO U.S. industrial production index FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
CPIAUCSL U.S. CPI for all urban consumers: all items FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
Additional variables
Expectations and uncertainty
BKEXP12M Oil price expectations (12-month) from Baumeister





MICH University of Michigan: inflation expectation FRED 1981M7-2017M12 Level
CPI6 SPF median inflation expectations (1 year horizon) Philadelphia FED 1981Q3-2017Q4 Level











CPILFESL U.S. CPI for all urban consumers: all items less food
and energy
FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
CPIENGSL U.S. CPI for all urban consumers: energy FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
CUSR0000SAN U.S. CPI for all urban consumers: nondurables FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
CUSR0000SAD U.S. CPI for all urban consumers: durables FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
CUSR0000SAS U.S. CPI for all urban consumers: services FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
Activity
UNRATE Civilian unemployment rate FRED 1974M1-2017M12 Level
RPCE U.S. personal consumption expenditures (PCE), de-
flated by chain-type price index (PCEPI)
FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
GDPC1 U.S. Real Gross Domestic Product FRED 1974Q1-2017Q4 100*log
GPDIC1 U.S. Real Gross Private Domestic Investment FRED 1974Q1-2017Q4 100*log
PCECC96 U.S. Real Personal Consumption Expenditures FRED 1974Q1-2017Q4 100*log
Financial variables
FF Effective federal funds rate FRED 1974M1-2017M12 Level
EBP Excess bond premium from Gilchrist and Zakrajšek
(2012)
Gilchrist’s webpage 1974M1-2017M12 Level
SPCOMP S&P 500 composite price index (monthly average) Datastream/
own calculations
1974M1-2017M12 100*log
Exchange rates and trade
TWEXBMTH Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Broad FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
TWEXMMTH Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Major Curren-
cies
FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log





USTOTPRCF U.S. terms of trade Datastream 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
USBALGDSB U.S. merchandise trade balance, as a share of nomi-
nal GDP (GDP from FRED)
Datastream/FRED 1974Q1-2017Q4 Level
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Table B.3: Description of data in online appendix
Variable Description Source Sample Trans.
Wider effects
RDNRGRC1M027SBEA U.S. PCE energy goods and services (DNR-
GRC1M027SBEA), deflated by DNR-
GRG3M086SBEA
FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
RPCEND U.S. PCE nondurable goods (PCEND), deflated by
DNDGRG3M086SBEA
FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
RPCEDG U.S. PCE durable goods (PCEDG), deflated by
DDURRG3M086SBEA
FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
RPCES U.S. PCE services (PCES), deflated by
DSERRG3M086SBEA
FRED 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
OILGSUS Oil & Gas stock price index (monthly average) Datastream/own
calculations
1974M1-2017M12 100*log
ELECTUS Electricity stock price index (monthly average) Datastream/own
calculations
1974M1-2017M12 100*log
MNINGUS Mining stock price index (monthly average) Datastream/own
calculations
1974M1-2017M12 100*log
AUTOSUS Automobiles stock price index (monthly average) Datastream/own
calculations
1974M1-2017M12 100*log
RTAILUS Retail stock price index (monthly average) Datastream/own
calculations
1974M1-2017M12 100*log









BRENTP Brent spot crude oil price (DCOILBRENTEU, ex-
tended using POILBREUSDM and WTISPLC) de-




REFINERCOST U.S. refiners acquisition cost of imported crude oil
(USCOCOIMA) deflated by U.S. CPI (CPIAUCSL)
Datastream 1974M1-2017M12 100*log
GLOBALACT Kilian’s (2009) index of global real economic activity Kilian’s webpage 1974M1-2015M12 Level
Figure B.1 shows the series included in the baseline VAR over the sample period
1974-2015. All the variables are depicted in logs.
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Figure B.1: Transformed data series in the baseline VAR
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C. Identification using external instruments
This Appendix shows how to identify the structural impact vector using external
instruments for the simple case with one instrument and one shock as well as the
general case with k instruments and k shocks.
C.1. Simple case with one shock and one instrument
In the following, I derive the structural impact vector for the simple case with
one instrument and one shock. Recall, the moment conditions for the external
instrument were given by
E[ztε1,t] = α 6= 0
E[ztε2:n,t] = 0.
Under these assumptions, s1 is identified up to sign and scale. To see this, note that
























Combining the two equations yields
s̃2:n,1 ≡ s2:n,1/s1,1 = E[ztu2:n,t]/E[ztu1,t], (2)
provided that E[ztu1,t] 6= 0. This condition is satisfied iff α 6= 0 and s1,1 6= 0. Thus,
s1 is identified up to scale, provided that these conditions hold.
The scale of s1 is then set by a normalization subject to
Σ = SΩS′.
One approach is to impose that Ω = In. This implies that a unit positive value of
ε1,t has a one standard deviation positive effect on y1,t. s1,1 can then be recovered















To economize on notation, parameters pertaining to the variables i ∈ {2, . . . , n} are
indexed by 2 instead of 2:n.









































Note that Σ is a covariance matrix and thus symmetric, i.e. σ′1,2 = σ2,1. Thus,












By substituting out s2,1 = s̃2,1s1,1, one can obtain
s21,1 + s1,2s
′
1,2 = σ1,1 (3)
s21,1s̃2,1 + S2,2s
′





2,2 = Σ2,2. (5)
From equation (3), it follows that s1,1 = ±
√
σ1,1 − s1,2s′1,2. Thus, it remains to
solve for s1,2s
′





1,2 = σ2,1 − s̃2,1σ1,1
(S2,2 − s̃2,1s1,2)s
′
1,2 = σ2,1 − s̃2,1σ1,1









= (σ2,1 − s̃2,1σ1,1)




































2,2 − (Σ2,2 − σ2,1s̃
′
2,1).







2,1) + 2Σ2,2 − s̃2,1σ1,2 − σ2,1s̃
′
2,1.
Similarly, by subtracting (3) pre-multiplied by s̃2,1 and post-multiplied by s̃
′
2,1







2,1 = Σ2,2 − σ1,1s̃2,1s̃
′
2,1.
Using this in the equation above gives








1,2 =(σ2,1 − s̃2,1σ1,1)






which completely characterizes the structural impact vector as a function of known
quantities. Note that by choosing the positive root s1,1 =
√
σ1,1 − s1,2s′1,2, one can
interpret s1,1 as the standard deviation of ε1,t, i.e. s1,1 = σε1 . The structural impact








Alternatively, one can set Ω = diag(σ2ε1 , . . . , σ
2
εn
) and s1,1 = x, which implies
that a unit positive value of ε1,t has a positive effect of magnitude x on y1,t. The








After having obtained the structural impact vector s1, it is straightforward to
compute all objects of interest such as IRFs, FEVDs, the structural shock series and
the historical decomposition (see e.g. Montiel-Olea, Stock, and Watson, 2016).
The above illustration of the identification strategy holds in population. In
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practice, identification is achieved as follows. Assume that there is a sample of size
n × T available. In a first step, estimate the reduced form to get estimates of the
reduced-form innovations ût. In a second step, estimate (2) by regressing û2:n,t on
û1,t using zt as an instrument. Finally, using the estimated residual covariance matrix
from step 1 and the IV estimates from step 2, impose the desired normalization to
obtain an estimate of the structural impact vector ŝ1.
Having obtained the impact vector, it is straightforward to compute all objects
of interest such as IRFs, FEVDs, and historical decompositions. In particular, as
shown in Stock and Watson (2018), it is also possible to compute the structural









= e′1εt (because S
−1s1 = e1)
= ε1,t,
where e1 is the first standard basis vector.
C.2. General case for k shocks and k instruments
In this Appendix, I provide more details on the identification strategy for the case
with k shocks and k instruments.





′, where ε1,t is the
k × 1 vector of structural shocks to be identified and ε2,t is a (n − k) × 1 vector
containing all other shocks. The identifying restrictions are given by the moment







where α is a k × k matrix (of full rank) and the covariance restrictions
SS′ = Σ.
In a next step, partition S as







where S1 is of dimension n× k, S2 is of dimension n× (n− k). S11 is of dimension
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k × k, S21 and S12 are of dimension (n − k) × k and k × (n − k), respectively, and
S22 is (n− k) × (n− k).



























21) = (Σzu′1 , Σzu′2),
or equivalently
αS′11 = Σzu′1
αS′21 = Σzu′2 .








which can be estimated from the data. In particular, Σ−1
zu′1
Σzu′2 corresponds to the
2SLS estimator in a regression of u2,t on u1,t using zt as an instrument for u1,t.












































Note that Σ is a covariance matrix and thus symmetric, i.e. Σ′12 = Σ21. Thus, this






































where L1 = chol(S11S
′
11) and L2 = chol(S22S
′
22). This still satisfies SS
′ = Σ. Thus,












































11 is identified by the instrument conditions. Thus, this is a
system of 3 matrix equations in 3 unknown matrices. The solutions are given by
S12S
′









































To show this, define a = S21S
−1
11 and b = S12S
−1







′ − aΣ12 − Σ21a

























The rest of the solutions then follows immediately from the original system of matrix
equations.













Recall, however, that this does only identify S up to a rotation. The parameter




























where R is an orthonormal rotation matrix. As I am only interested in identifying
the first k shocks, identification of S1 amounts to choose an appropriate rotation
submatrix Rk. In the application at hand, Rk = I is a reasonable choice provided
that world oil production is ordered first and the real price of oil is ordered second
in the VAR. Because L1 is a lower triangular matrix, this amounts to assume that
the oil supply news shock does not affect world oil production on impact. This
additional assumption identifies the two structural shocks.
D. Identification via heteroskedasticity
This Appendix provides more detail on the heteroskedasticity-based identification
strategy. In the following, I derive the formula for the structural impact vector.
As discussed in the main text, we assume that movements in the oil futures zt
we observe in the data are governed by both oil supply news and other shocks:




where εj,t are other shocks affecting oil futures and vt captures measurement error
such as microstructure noise, satisfying vt ∼ iidN(0, σ
2
v).
Recall, the identifying assumption is that the variance of oil supply news shocks
increases at the time of OPEC announcements while the variance of all other shocks




σ2εj ,R1 = σ
2
εj ,R2




where R1 is the treatment sample of OPEC announcements and R2 is the control
sample.
Under these assumptions, the structural impact vector obtains as
s1 =
ER1[ztut] − ER2[ztut]





To see why this is the case, note that
ER1[ztut] − ER2[ztut]

















where the first equality uses ut = Sεt and the second equality follows directly from
σ2εj ,R1 = σ
2
εj ,R2
and σ2v,R1 = σ
2
v,R2, and the fact that the structural shocks are mutually
uncorrelated.
As shown by Rigobon and Sack (2004), we can also obtain this estimator through
an IV approach, using z̃ = (z′R1, −z
′
R2)




regression of U = (U′R1, U
′
R2)
′ on z, where z is an T × 1 vector containing the
daily changes in futures prices in the treatment and the control regime and U is a
T ×n matrix containing the reduced-form residuals in the treatment and the control
regime. To see why this is the case, substitute these expressions in the IV estimator
E[z̃′z]−1 E[z̃′U], and the above estimator obtains.
Based on s1, it is then straightforward to compute the impulse responses to the
oil supply news shock and all other objects of interest. As in the external instruments
case, we can also obtain an estimate of the structural shock. From the covariance



































8Note that we can also estimate the shock based on the covariance matrix of the second regime.
In population, the two should be the same. In my sample, the two were almost identical (correlation
stands at over 99 percent).
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